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ABSTRACT
Development of Decision Support System for Reliability.
Mitesh B. Parekh
Reliability analysis is now an essential part of any product development. In the field
of Electrical Engineering, reliability models are developed and analyzed for every component
before it comes to market. The complexity of the product can range from a simple transistor
to an integrated circuit chip, from a simple communication link to a complex network, and
from a small generator to a large powerhouse.
Over the period, several techniques have been developed to systematically model real
systems and then analyze them. These techniques are constantly being enhanced to improve
the modeling process and to reduce the time required for the analysis of that model. A wellmodeled system may be too complex to be analyzed within a reasonable amount of time. On
the other hand, an oversimplified model may not be able to depict the characteristics of a real
system. A global solution to these problems is to reach a compromise between the model
complexity and model execution and analysis time.
The objectives of this research were to study several hardware-software reliability
models, and existing algorithms to compute system reliability and to select an approach that
can be efficiently implemented on personal computer. A comprehensive software tool that
uses both hardware and software reliability models and computes exact reliability of a system
was developed using Visual Basic.
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1.1

Background of Reliability
Since the first electronic digital computer was invented almost fifty years ago, human

beings have become dependant on computers in their daily lives. The computer revolution
has created the fastest technological advancement that the world has ever seen. Today,
computer hardware and software permeates all aspects of our society. The newest cameras,
VCRs, and automobile could not be controlled and operated without computers. Computers
are also embedded in wristwatches, telephones, home appliances, buildings, and aircraft.
Science and technology have been demanding high performance hardware and high quality
software for making improvements and breakthroughs.
industry,

automotive,

avionics,

oil,

We can look at virtually any

telecommunications,

banking,

semiconductor,

pharmaceutics and see that, they rely heavily on computers for their functioning capabilities.
The size and complexity of computer- intensive systems have grown dramatically,
and this trend will certainly continue in the future.

Contemporary examples of highly

complex hardware/software systems can be found in projects undertaken by NASA,
Department of Defense (DoD), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the
telecommunications industry and a variety of other private industries. For instance, NASA’s
Space Shuttles flies with approximately 500,000 lines of software code on board and 3.5
million lines of code in ground control and processing. After being scaled down from its
original plan, the International Space Station Alpha is still projected to have millions of lines
of software to operate innumerable hardware pieces for its navigation, communication, and
experimentation. In the telecommunications industry, operations for telephone carriers are
supported by hundreds of software systems, with hundreds of millions of lines of source
1

code.

In avionics industry, almost all-new payload instruments contain their own

microprocessor system with extensive embedded software. A massive amount of hardware
and software also exists in the FAA's Advanced Automation System, the new generation of
air traffic control system. Today’s offices and homes computers cannot function without an
operating system (e.g., Windows) ranging from 1 to 5 million lines of source code and many
other shrink-wrapped software packages of similar size provide our daily use of these
computers in variety of applications.
The demand for complex hardware/software systems has increased more rapidly than
the ability to design, implement, test and maintain them.

When requirements for the

dependencies on computers increase, the possibility of crises from computer failures also
increases. The impact of these failures ranges from inconvenience (e.g., malfunctions of
home appliances), economic damage (e.g., interruptions of banking systems), to loss of life
(e.g., failures of flight systems or medical software).
The word Reliability is used in everyday life in more qualitative terms than
quantitative terms. It is often said that a particular equipment, motor, or automobile is
reliable or unreliable, implying that it is dependable or not dependable, respectively. If a
component is dependable, the possibility that it can ever fail cannot be ruled out. It merely
means that the probability for failure of this component is low or very low. Conversely, if a
component is not dependable, it does not mean that it will not work. Thus, the everyday use
of the word Reliability - the quality of being reliable - is purely qualitative.
However, in engineering such qualitative statements are considered vague, because
there is no information about the probability that a component will work or fail. Moreover, it
is not known for how long a component that is currently working will continue to work
without failure. This brings the aspect of availability into picture. Thus, for engineering

2

applications reliability must be expressed in quantitative terms. This requires developing a
reliability model, which will help to predict the effect of time on system reliability.

1.2

Reliability engineering- Present Status
Reliability analysis is now an essential part of any product development. In the field

of Electrical Engineering, reliability models are developed and analyzed for every component
before it comes to market. The complexity of the product can range from a simple transistor
to an integrated circuit chip, from a simple communication link to a complex network, and
from a small generator to a large powerhouse.
Over the period, several techniques have been developed to systematically model real
systems and then analyze them. These techniques are constantly being enhanced to improve
the modeling process and to reduce the time required for the analysis of that model. A wellmodeled system may be too complex to be analyzed within a reasonable amount of time. On
the other hand, an oversimplified model may not be able to depict the characteristics of a real
system. A global solution to these problems is to reach a compromise between the model
complexity and model execution and analysis time.

1.3

Reliability in Communication Networks
A typical communication network consists of transmission lines, repeaters, routers,

bridges, and gateways of known performance ratings. A message may have to pass through
one or more of these elements. Such a network can be represented by a connected graph
consisting of links and nodes. Links represent the transmission lines and nodes represent
nodal equipment like repeaters, routers, etc. Failures of some of the nodes or links may affect
the performance of the network in terms of delivering the message to its destination. Hence,

3

the reliability for a message to get through is sometimes improved by adding redundant links
and/or nodes to the network
Some of the important parameters of a communication network are cost, throughput,
delay, and reliability [1]. In this thesis, techniques are developed to determine only the
reliability parameter of the network.

The term Reliability in this context means the

probability that the network will perform satisfactorily in delivering messages across the
network in a time period of intent.

1.4

Statement of the Problem
As mentioned in Section 1.3, reliability is an important parameter of any system.

Various techniques are used to compute the system reliability. These techniques can be
classified into two categories.

The first category consists of techniques that find an

approximate reliability solution [2-5], whereas the second category consists of techniques that
find the exact reliability solution [6-9]. Some of the commonly used techniques that find the
exact network reliability are the conditional probability technique, the cutset technique and
the tieset technique. A brief description of these techniques along with their advantages and
disadvantages is presented in Chapter 3. A major problem with the above techniques is the
complexity of computation. For a large complex system the computations times can be
extensive to be executed. Symbolic manipulation is the main bottleneck of the algorithms
that determine the exact system reliability. The approximate reliability solutions that make
use of the simplifying assumptions are much faster than the exact solutions. The penalty paid
for this fast computation is a certain degree of inaccuracy in the solution. Another limitation
of the approximate solution is that it does not produce the symbolic expression for terminal
reliability. Determining symbolic expression for reliability is important to reevaluate the
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system reliability if the reliability of an individual link has changed, or to improve the system
reliability under a given cost constraint.

1.5

Objectives of this Research
The objectives of this research are to:


Study several hardware-software reliability models, and existing
algorithms to compute system reliability and to select an approach that can
be efficiently implemented on personal computer.



Develop a comprehensive software tool that uses both hardware and
software reliability models and computes exact reliability of a system.



Analyze several practical interconnection networks and examples in the
literature to validate and demonstrate effectiveness of software tool..

1.6

Thesis Outline
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 provides some fundamental

concepts in reliability, statement of the problem, and organization of this thesis. Chapter 2
deals with literature review in the field of reliability. Chapter 3 deals with the concept of
hardware, software and system reliability. In addition, Chapter 3 discusses the algorithm,
which is used to calculate the reliability of complex systems. Chapter 4 deals the design and
development of software.

Chapter 5 covers the implementation and validation of the

software. The network examples are from published literature. Finally, Chapter 6 provides
insight to the conclusion of the research and what future research can be carried out.

5
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This chapter reviews development of both hardware reliability and software reliability
models, the purpose is to indicate which concepts have been tried successfully or not
successfully and which have been modified and adapted. There are number of themes in
historical development.

 The creation of various models relating reliability to time failures experienced and
other variables.

 A concern with how to estimate model parameters
 An interest in comparison of models, which led to the development of comparison
criteria.

 The classification of models
 An increasing concern with collecting better data.
2.1

Examples of Major Disasters
Failures are much more significant in both their economic and safety effects. For

example, in 1946 the entire fleet of Lockheed Constellation aircraft was grounded following a
crash killing four of the five-crew members. The crash was attributed to a faulty design in an
electrical conduit that caused the fuselage to burn. In 1979 the left engine of a DC-10 broke
away from the aircraft during takeoff, killing 271 people. Poor maintenance procedures and a
bad design led to the crash. Engine removal procedures introduced unacceptable stresses on
the pylons.

The Ford Pinto, introduced in 1971, was recalled by Ford in 1978 for

modifications to the fuel tank to reduce fuel leakage and fires resulting from rear-end
collisions.

Numerous reported deaths, lawsuits, and the negative publicity eventually
6

contributed to Ford discontinuing production of the Pinto. Firestone's steel-belted radials,
introduced in 1972, failed at an abnormal rate as a result of the outer tread breaking apart
from the main body of the tire. Because of the excessive number of failures, Firestone was
forced to recall 7.5 million tires. On November 8, 1940, the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, five
months old, collapsed into Puget Sound from vibrations caused by high winds. Metal fatigue
induced by several months of oscillations led to the failure.

The Manus River Bridge

(Greenwich, Connecticut) collapsed in 1983, killing three people and injuring three. While
there is disagreement on the cause of the disaster, blame has been placed on the original
design, on corrosion that caused undetected displacement of the pin and hanger suspension
assembly, on poor maintenance, and on inadequate inspections. The Hartford (Connecticut)
Civic Center Coliseum roof collapsed in 1978 from structural failure due to the weight of the
snow and ice accumulated on the roof. A major shortcoming in the roof frame system was
the lack of redundancy of members to carry loads when other individual members failed. An
inadequate safety margin may also have contributed. The Three Mile Island disaster in 1979,
which resulted in a partial meltdown of a nuclear reactor, was a result of both mechanical and
human error. When a backup cooling system was down for routine maintenance, air cut off
the flow of cooling water to the reactor. Warning lights were hidden by maintenance tags.
An emergency relief valve failed to close, causing additional water to be lost from the cooling
system. Operators were either reading gauges that were not working properly or taking the
wrong actions on the basis of those that were operating. The 1986 explosion of the space
shuttle Challenger was a result of the failure of the rubber O-rings that were used to seal the
four sections of the booster rockets. The below freezing temperatures before the launch
contributed to the failure by making the rubber brittle. [10]
Software failures were highlighted in several major programs. In NASA's Voyager
project, the Uranus encounter was in jeopardy because of late software deliveries and reduced
7

capability in deep space network. Several space shuttle missions have been delayed due to
hardware/software interaction problem. In one DoD project, software problems caused the
first flight of the AFTI/F-6 jet fighter to be delayed over a year and none of the advanced
modes originally planned could be used.
Critical software failures have affected numerous civil and scientific applications.
The ozone hole over Antarctica would have received attention sooner from scientific
community if a data analysis program had not suppressed the anomalous data because it was
"out of range". Software glitches in an automated baggage handling system forced the
Denver International Airport to sit empty more than a year after airplanes were to fill its gates
and runways [11]
Many software systems and packages are distributed and installed in identical or
similar copies, all of which are vulnerable to same software failure. This is why even the
most powerful software companies like Microsoft are fearful of the killer bugs, which can
wipe out all the profits if a call back is required on the tens of millions of copies of the
product [12].

To end this, many software companies see a major share of project

development costs identified with the design, implementation, and assurance of reliable
software, and they recognize a tremendous need for systematic approaches using software
reliability engineering techniques. Clearly, developing the required techniques for reliability
engineering is a major challenge to computer engineers, software engineers, industrial
engineers, and engineers of various disciplines for now and decade to come [13].

2.2

Development of Hardware Reliability
Reliability engineering, as a separate engineering discipline, originated in the United

States during the 1950s. The increasing complexity of military electronic systems was
generating failure rates, which resulted in generally reduced availability and increased costs.
8

Solid state electronics technology offered long-term hope, but conversely miniaturization was
to lead to proportionately greater complexity, which offset the reliability improvements
expected. The gathering pace of electronic device technology meant that the developers of
new military systems were making increasing use of large numbers of new components types,
involving new manufacturing processes, with the inevitable consequences of low reliability.
The users of such equipment were also finding that the problems of diagnosing and repairing
the new complex equipment were seriously affecting its availability for use, and the costs of
spares, training and other logistics support were becoming excessive.

Against this

background the US DoD and the electronics industry jointly set up the Advisory Group on
Reliability of Electronic Equipment (AGREE) in 1952. The AGREE report concluded that,
to break out of the spiral of increasing development and ownership costs due to low
reliability, disciplines must be laid down as integral activities in the development cycle for
electronic equipment. The report laid particular stress on the need for new equipment to be
tested for several thousand hours in high stress cyclical environments including high and low
temperatures, vibration and switching, in order to discover the majority of weak areas in a
design at an early enough stage to enable them to be corrected before production commenced.
Until that time, environmental tests of tens of duration had been considered adequate to prove
the suitability of a design. The report also recommended that formal demonstrations of
reliability, in terms of statistical confidence that a specified Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) had been exceeded, be instituted as a condition for acceptance of equipment by the
procuring agency. A large part of the report was devoted to providing detailed test plans for
various levels of statistical confidence and environmental conditions.
The AGREE report was accepted by the DoD, and AGREE testing quickly became a
standard procedure. Companies that invested in the expensive environmental test equipment
necessary soon found that they could attain levels of reliability far higher than by traditional
9

methods. It was evident that designers, particularly those working at the fringes of advanced
technology, could not be expected to produce highly reliable equipment without it being
subjected to a test regime that would show up weaknesses.

Complex systems and the

components used in them included too many variables and interactions for the human
designer to cope with infallibly, and even the most careful design reviews and disciplines
could not provide sufficient protection. Consequently it was necessary to make the product
speak for itself, by causing it to fail, and then to eliminate the weaknesses that caused the
failures. The DoD reissued the AGREE report on testing as US Military Standard (MIL-STD)
781, Reliability Qualification and Production Approval Tests.
Meanwhile the revolution in electronic device technology continued, led by integrated
micro-circuitry. Increased emphasis was now placed on improving the quality of devices
fitted to production equipment. Screening techniques, in which devices are temperatures
cycled, vibrated, centrifuged, operated at electrical overstress and otherwise abused, were
introduced in place of the traditional sampling techniques. With component populations on
even single printed circuit boards becoming so large, sampling no longer provided sufficient
protection against the production of defective equipment. These techniques were formalized
in military standards covering the full range of electronic components.

Components

produced to these standards were called 'Hi-rel' components.
Engineering reliability effort in the United States developed quickly, and the AGREE
and reliability program concepts were adopted by NASA and many other major suppliers and
purchasers of high technology equipment.

In 1965 the D0D issued MIL-STD-785-

Reliability Programs for Systems and Equipment.

This document made mandatory the

integration of a program of reliability engineering activities with the traditional engineering
activities of design, development and production, as it was by then realized that such an
integrated program was the only way to ensure that potential reliability problems would be
10

detected and eliminated at the earliest, and therefore the cheapest, stage in the development
cycle. Much written work appeared on the cost-benefit of higher reliability, to show that
effort and resources expended during early development and during production testing, plus
the imposition of demonstrations of specified levels of reliability to MIL-STD-781, led to
reductions in service costs which more than repaid the reliability program expenditure.
The concept of life cycle costs (LCC), or whole life costs, was introduced. In the
United Kingdom, Defense Standard 00-40, The Management of Reliability and
Maintainability was issued in 1981. The British Standards Institution has issued BS 5760Guide on Reliability of Systems, Equipment's and Components.
Specifications and test systems for electronic components, based upon the US
Military Standards, have been developed in the United Kingdom and in continental Europe.
Electronic component standards including test and quality aspects are being harmonized
internationally through the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) [14].

2.3

Software Reliability Development
The first study on software reliability appears to have been conducted by Hudson

[15]. He reviewed software development as a birth and death process. Fault generation was
a birth and fault correction was a death. He generally confined his work to pure death
process, for reasons of mathematical tractability. The number of faults detected follows
binomial distribution whose mean value function of time has a Weibull distribution. Data
from the system test phase of one program was presented. Reasonable agreement between
model and data is obtained if the system test phase is split into three overlapping sub-phases
and separate fits made for each.
The next major steps were made by Jelinski and Moranda [16] and Shooman [17].
Both assumed hazard rate for failures that was piecewise constant and proportional to the
11

number of faults remaining. The hazard rate changes at each fault correction by constant
amount but is constant between corrections. Shooman [17] postulated that hazard rate was
proportional to fault density per instruction, the number of unique instructions executed per
unit time, and a bulk constant. The bulk constant represented the proportion of faults that
causes failure.
Schick and Wolverton [18] proposed another early model. The hazard rate assumed
was proportional to the product of the number of faults remaining and the time. Hence, the
size of the changes in hazard rate increase with time. Wagoner [19] suggested a model in
which the hazard rate was proportional to the number of faults remaining and power of time.
This power could be varied to fit the data. In 1978 Schick and Wolverton [20] proposed
modified model in which hazard rate is a parabolic function instead of linear function of time.
Schneidewind [21] initially approached software reliability modeling from empirical
viewpoint. He recommended the investigation of different reliability functions and selection
of the distribution that best fit the particular project in question. In later paper Schneidewind
[22] viewed fault detection per time interval as a Non-Homogenous Poisson Process (NHPP)
with an exponential mean value function. He also suggested that the time lag between failure
detection and failure correction be determined from actual data and used to correct the time
scale in forecast.
Moranda [23] has also proposed two variants of the Jelinski- Moranda model. In
“geometric de-eutrophication process”, the hazard rate decreases in steps that form a
geometric progression. The second, called the Geometric Poisson Model (GPM), has a
hazard rate which also decreases in geometric progression. However, the decrements occur
at fixed intervals rather than at each failure correction.
Shortly after some early work, Musa [24] presented an Execution Time Model of
software reliability. This theory built on earlier contributions but also broke new ground in
12

several ways.

He postulated that execution time, the actual processor time utilized in

executing the program, was the best practical measure of failure, inducing stress, that was
being placed on the program. Hence he concluded that reliability theory should be based on
execution time rather than calendar time. Musa [24] also had observed that when rates were
taken with respect to execution time, the fault correction rate was generally proportional to
the fault detection or hazard rate.

This observation made consideration of debugging

personnel profiles unnecessary. The concepts were tested in real time on four development
projects with excellent result. Thus modeling approach became universal and much easier to
apply. Hecht [25] has independently verified the simplification resulting from looking at
software reliability as a function of execution time rather than calendar time.
A calendar time component was developed for the model that related execution time
to calendar time, allowing execution time predictions to be converted into dates.

The

calendar time component is based on the fact that available resources limit the amount of
execution that is practical each time.
A Bayesian approach to software reliability measurement was taken by Littlewood
and Verrall [26]. Almost all published models assume that failures occur randomly during
the operation of program. However, while most postulate simply that the value of hazard rate
is a function of number of faults remaining, Littlewood and Verrall modeled it as random
variable. One of the parameters of the distribution of this random variable is assumed to vary
with the number of failures experienced. It thus characterizes reliability change. Littlewood
and Verrall proposed various functional forms for the description of this variation. The
values of the parameters of each functional form that produce best fit for that form is
determined. Then functional forms are compared and the best fitting form is selected.

13

Keiller [27] investigated model similar to Littlewood-Verrall general model.

It

characterizes the randomness of the hazard rate with the same distribution. However, it uses
a different parameter of that distribution to express reliability change.
The differential fault model proposed by Littlewood may be viewed as a variant of
general Littelwood- Verrall model [28]. It is similar in viewing the hazard rate as a random
variable and using in Bayesian inference.

Reliability growth is modeled through two

mechanisms. One is number of faults remaining. The second is the variation of the per fault
hazard rate with time. Littlewood considers that uncertainties in reliability growth probably
result more from uncertainties in the relative frequencies of execution of different input states
than uncertainties in fault correction.
Goel and Okumoto [29] developed a modification of Jelinski- Moranda model for
case of imperfect debugging. It is based on a view of debugging as a markov process, with
appropriate transition probabilities between states. Several useful quantities can be derived
analytically, with mathematics remaining tractable. Kremer [30] developed this idea further,
including the possibility of introducing new faults due to repair activity.

In Goel and

Okumoto [31] reasoning from assumptions similar to those of Jelinski-Moranda, described
failure detection as NHPP with an exponentially decaying rate function. The cumulative
number of failures detected and the distribution of remaining failures are both found to be
Poisson. A simple modification of NHPP model was investigated by Yamada, Ohba, and
Osaki [32] where the cumulative number of failures detected is described as a S-shaped
curve.
Crow [33] proposed a model for reliability estimation of hardware systems during
development testing. It is a NHPP process with a failure intensity function that is a power
function in time. It can be applied to software with certain ranges of parameter values.
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It is seen that much of early history of software reliability modeling involved looking
at different possible models. In the late 70's and 80's, efforts began to focus on comparing
software reliability models, with objective of selecting the best ones. The initial efforts at
comparison suffered from lack of good failure data and lack of agreement on the criteria to be
used in making comparisons.

Examination of the basic concepts underlying software

reliability modeling and development of classification scheme has helped to clarify and
organize comparisons and to suggest possible new models. This work led to the development
of Musa-Okumoto [34] Logarithmic-Poisson execution time model, which combines
simplicity, with high predictive validity. The Logarithmic Poisson model is based on NHPP
with an intensity function that decreases exponentially with expected failures experienced.
Measurement is vital element in the practice of engineering. In addition, with respect
to the major disasters cited in this chapter, reliability is one of the most important
measurements. An understanding of the failure process is central to any effort to model and
comprehend reliability.
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The reliability of a system is defined as the probability that it will adequately perform
its intended function—without failure—for a specified interval of time under stated
environmental conditions, which may be defined as the user requirements. Roughly, it can be
said that, reliability is inversely proportional to the rate at which failures occur [35].
In this chapter a number of terms related to reliability, such as reliability function,
expected life, hazard rate, and failure rate, will be defined and one important reliability
function will be described. These concepts apply to software and hardware reliability in
general.
3.1

Hardware Reliability
If T is a random variable representing the failure time of a system, then the probability

that the system will fail by time t, i.e., the failure probability, is
t
F(t) = P[T ≤ t] = ⌠
⌡ f(x) dx.
0

(3.1)

Here, f(t) represents the probability (or failure) density function and F(t) the cumulative
distribution function.
The reliability function, i.e., the probability that the system survives until time t, is
defined as
∞
R(t) = P[T > t] = 1 − F(t) = ⌠
⌡ f(x) dx

(3.2)

t
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In other words, R(t) represents the probability that the system will not have failed by time t
assuming it is fault-free at time 0.
The expected life E[T], or mean time to failure (MTTF)—also denoted by Θ—is
simply the mean or the expected value of the failure density function:
∞

E [T] =

∫ t ⋅ f (t )dt .

(3.3)

0

It can be shown also that
∞

E [T] =

∫ R(t )dt .

(3.4)

0

Mean time to repair (MTTR) is the time during which repair or replacement is
occurring. Mean time between failures (MTBF) is the sum of MTTF and MTTR.
The failure rate is the probability that a failure per unit time occurs in an interval such
as [t1, t2], knowing that a failure has not occurred before t1:
P[t1 ≤ T < t2]
P[t1 ≤ T < t2 | T > t1]
=
t2 − t1
(t2 − t1) P[T > t1]

=

F(t2) − F(t1)
.
(t2 − t1) R(t1)

(3.5)

The hazard rate, on the other hand, is defined as the limit of the failure rate as the
interval approaches to zero:
lim F(t + ∆t) − F(t) f(t)
z(t) = ∆t→0
= R(t).
∆t R(t)

(3.6)

So, there is a difference between the hazard rate and failure rate; the hazard rate is an
instantaneous rate of failure at time t for a system of age t. The hazard rate changes over the
17

life cycle of a physical system, typically it decreases, remains constant, and then increases
with time giving a “bathtub curve.”

Burn-in

Useful Life

Wear -Out

z(t)

t

Figure 3.1 The Bathtub-Curve
3.1.1

Exponential Distribution:
For an exponential distribution, the failure rate is constant and equal to λ. This is an

important property characteristic of the exponential distribution and does not appear with any
other continuous distribution. If a component or a system has a failure free operating time
that is exponentially distributed, its behavior in the future will not depend on how long it has
already been operating.
Model Form:
A continuous positive random variable t has an exponential distribution if cumulative failure
distribution is F (t) = 1 − exp (−λt).
The probability density function is
f(t) = λ exp(−λt), λ > 0,
Reliability is given by,

R (t ) = e − λ ⋅t

(3.7)
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3.1.2

Normal Distribution
A commonly used distribution function in theory and practice is the normal

distribution. A normally distributed variable assumes values from - ∞ to + ∞. The density of
normal distribution is symmetric with respect to the mean of distribution.
Model Form
A continuous positive random variable t has a normal distribution if probability density
function.

f (t ) =
3.1.3

1
e
2π σ

 −1 t − µ 2 
 
 
 2 σ  



(3.8)

Log-Normal Distribution
The positive random variable t has a Log-Normal distribution when logarithm of time

is normally distributed. The density of the Log-Normal distribution has important property
that it is practically zeroed at the origin, increases to maximum, and then decreases relatively
quickly. The Log-Normal function is therefore suitable for modeling repair times. It is also
used as a distribution function for the failure free operating time components in accelerated
reliability testing as well as in cases where a large number of statistically independent random
variables are combined together in a multiplicative fashion.
Model Form

1
f (t ) =
e
2π st

 −1  t

ln 
 2s2  t
 med






2





(3.9)

3.1.4 Weibull Distribution
It is one of the most useful distributions in hardware reliability. It can be used for
both increasing and decreasing failure rate. The Weibull distribution with β >1, often occurs
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in applications as a distribution of the failure free operating times of components which are
subject to wearout and/or fatigue.
Model Form
A continuous positive random variable t has a Weibull distribution if, probability density
function is

βt
f (t ) =  
θ θ 
3.2

β −1

.e

t
− 
θ 

β

(3.10)

Software Reliability
Software reliability represents a user- (or customer-) oriented view of software

quality. It relates directly to operation rather than design of the program, and hence it is
dynamic rather that static.

For this reason software reliability is interested in failures

occurring and not faults in a program. Reliability measures are much more useful than fault
measures. Software reliability may be expected to vary during the software development
period. It becomes apparent that the distinction between the terms “failure” and “fault” is an
important one.
Failure means a function of the software that does not meet user requirement [36]. It
is an external behavior of the system deviating from that is required by its specifications. In
other words, failure is something dynamic, i.e., occurring at execution time. It is not a bug or
fault. It is more general. For example, excessive response time may be considered as a failure
if it does not meet the specifications.
On the other hand, a fault, or bug, is a defect in a program, that when executed under
particular conditions will result in a failure. A fault can be a source of more than one failure.
By definition, there cannot be multiple faults causing a single failure.
A fault may result from an error made by the programmer. Errors occur because of
(a) incomplete communication between the people involved in a project or between different
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times for the same person; (b) defective knowledge of the application area, the design
methodology, and the programming language; (c) incomplete analysis of the possible
conditions that can occur at a given point in the program; and (d) transcription errors.
The probability, or relative frequency of times, that a given program will work as
intended by the user, i.e., without failures, in a specified environment and for a specified
duration can be termed as software reliability. The aim of a software engineer is to increase
this probability and make it as close to one as possible. To do this he or she must measure
the reliability of the software. A commonly used approach for measuring software reliability
is by using an analytical model whose parameters are generally estimated from available data
on software failures.
Reliability quantities have usually been defined with respect to time, although it is
possible to define them with respect to other variables. Time may be considered in three
different ways [36]:
(A) Execution time (τ), i.e., CPU time;
(B) Calendar time ; and
(C) Clock time, i.e., the sum of times passed from program start to program end, without
counting shutdown periods.
Execution time is considered superior to calendar time [36].
There are four general ways of characterizing failure occurrences in time:

 time-based
(B) Time interval between failures (incremental)
(A) Time of failure

(C) Cumulative failures experienced up to a given time
 failure-based
(D) Failures experienced in a time interval

All these four quantities are in fact random variables, because, (a) the locations of
faults within a program are unknown; and (b) the conditions of program execution are
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generally unpredictable.

Of course, this does not mean that they are completely

unpredictable.
A random process is a set of random variables, each corresponding to a point in time.
In reliability studies there are two characteristics of a random process: (a) the probability
distribution of the random variables, e.g., Poisson; and (b) the variation of the process with
time.

A random process whose probability distribution varies with time is called

nonhomogeneous. Two functions can be defined for the time variation of a random process:
(a) the mean value function, µ, as the average cumulative failures associated with each time
point; and (b) the failure intensity function, λ, as the rate of change of mean value function or
the number of failures per unit time. Note that the failure intensity function is the derivative
of the mean value function.
When there are no changes in the software, i.e., no debugging and software
corrections take place, then λ is constant and a homogeneous random process takes place.
On the contrary, when software corrections occur, a nonhomogeneous process as described
above takes place. Figure 3.2 illustrates the mean value and related failure intensity functions
of such a process. These graphs are typical in the sense that the mean number of failures
experienced increases with time in such a manner that the failure intensity decreases.

µ(τ)

λ(τ)

τ

τ

Figure 3.2: Failure Intensity Curve and Mean Value Function.
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This behavior is affected by two factors: (a) the number of faults in the software; and (b) the
execution environment.
Let M(t) be a random process representing the number of failures experienced by time
t. Then the mean value function is defined as

µ(τ) = E[M(τ)],

(3.11)

i.e., the expected number of failures at time t. The failure intensity function of the M(τ)
process is the instantaneous rate of change of the expected number of failures with respect to
time, or

λ(τ) =

dµ (τ )
.
dτ

(3.12)

The “time” used here may be any one of the above-mentioned three times, but
execution time is generally preferred in order to be compatible with hardware reliability.
Principal factors affecting software reliability are fault introduction, fault removal,
and environment [36].

Fault introduction depends on the characteristics of the code

developed, i.e., created or modified—such as its size—and of the development process—such
as software engineering technology and tools used and level of experience of programmers.
Fault removal depends on time, operational profile, and the quality of repair activity.
Environment is determined by the operational profile, which is the set of run types that a
program can execute along with the probabilities with which they will occur. It is generally
established by enumerating the possible input states and their probabilities of occurrence or
by specifying the sequence of program modules executed.
As faults are removed, as in test phase, failure intensity tends to decrease and
reliability to increase. When faults are introduced during operation or test, as in cases when
new features or design changes are being introduced into the system or when faults
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predominate repairs during debugging, there tends to be a step increase in failure intensity
and a step decrease in reliability. If a system is stable, as in a program that has been released
and there are no changes in code, both failure intensity and reliability tend to be constant.
The term mean time to failure (MTTF), which means the average value of next failure
interval, is not used so extensively in software reliability as in hardware reliability, since in
many cases it is undefined. Instead, failure intensity, which is roughly the inverse of MTTF,
is preferred.
3.2.1

Finite Failure Category Models:
The finite failure category models have a fixed number of faults. The fault concept is

often useful for developing finite category models because of the physical reality of defects in
program. The models are classified according to how the failure quantity distribution is
specified. Poisson and binomial are the most important model in this group. Binomial type
models have deterministic number of faults and failures and one fault is removed for each
failure. Poisson type models have random number of failures and the number of faults
removed for each failure is a random variable. The models under this category are:
1. Schick-Wolverton model: This is an example of where failure distribution exhibits
Weilbull distribution.
2. Basic Musa model: here the failure distribution is of exponential type.
3. S - Shaped Model: in this model failure distribution follows Gamma distribution.
3.2.1.1 Schick-Wolverton Model:
In this model per fault failure distribution is traditional Weibull distributions. This
model belongs to finite failures category and is the binomial type. This model has greater
flexibility given for the failure modeling because of the shape and scale parameters that
define them. The basic assumptions and the data requirements are as follows:
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There are a fixed number of faults in the software at the beginning of the time in
which the software is observed.



The time to failure of fault b0 is distributed as a Weibull distribution with parameter
b1 and b2. The density function is f (τ ) = b0 ∗ b1 ∗ τ ∗b 2−1 ∗e −b1∗τ with b1,b2 >0. For
b2

Schick Wolverton model value of b2 (the shape parameter) is 2.


The number of faults (f1, f2, . . . fn) detected in each of the respective intervals [(t0 = 0,
t1), (t1, t2)... (ti-1, ti)… (tn-l, tn)] are independent for any finite collection of times.

The data requirements to implement this fault count model are:
♦ The fault counts in each of the testing intervals i.e., the fi. And the completion
time of each period that the software is under observation i.e., ti's.
The failure intensity and mean value function is given by as follows:

λ (τ ) = b0 ∗ b1 ∗ b2 ∗ τ b 2−1 ∗ e −b1∗τ

b2

µ (τ ) = b0 ∗ (1 − e −b1∗τ )
b2

(3.13)

3.2.1.2 Basic Musa Model:
The Basic Musa model has the widest distribution among the software reliability
models and was developed by John Musa of AT&T Bell Laboratories [36]. Musa has been a
leading contributor in this field and has been a major proponent of using models to aid in
determining the reliability of software. This model was one of the firsts to use the actual
execution time of the software component on a computer for the modeling process. The
assumptions and the data requirements for the model are as follows:
1. The cumulative number of failures by time τ, µ(τ), follows a Poisson process with
mean value function µ (τ ) = b0 ∗ (1 − e −b1∗τ ) , where, b0, b1>0 mean value function is
such that the expected number of failure occurrences for any time period is
proportional to the expected number of undetected faults at that time.

Since
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lim µ(τ) = lim b0 ∗ (1 − e − b1∗τ ) it is a finite failure model. The parameter b0 is the

τ→∞

τ→∞

total number of faults that would be detected in that limit.
2. The execution times between the failure are piecewise exponentially distributed, i.e.,
the hazard rate for a single fault is constant. This is why this model belongs to the
exponential class.
3. The quantities of the resources (number of fault-identification, -correction personnel
and computer times) that are available are constant over a segment for which the
software is observed.
4. Fault-identification personnel are fully utilized and computer utilization is constant.
5. Fault-correction personnel utilization is established by the limitation of fault queue
length for any fault-correction person. Fault queue is determined by assuming that
fault correction is a Poisson process and that servers are randomly assigned in time.
Assumptions 3 through 5 are needed only if the second component of the basic execution
model linking execution time and calendar time is desired.
The data requirements to implement this fault count model are:
♦ Either the actual times that the software failed, t1, t2, . . . tn or the elapsed time
between failures xl, x2, . . . xn, where xi = ti - ti-1.
The failure intensity and the mean value function are given as:
λ (τ ) = b0 ∗ b1 ∗ e −b1∗τ
µ (τ ) = b0 ∗ (1 − e −b1∗τ )

(3.14)

3.2.1.3 S-Shaped model:
The S-shaped reliability growth model falls under the gamma distribution class. Here
the per-fault failure distribution is gamma. The number of failures per time period, however,
is a Poisson type. It is a finite failure model, i.e.,

lim
(µ(τ) ) < ∞ . It is patterned, as the
τ→∞
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mean value function is often a characteristic S-shaped. The software error detection process
can be described as an S-shaped growth curve to reflect the initial learning curve at the
beginning, as test team members become familiar with the software, followed by growth and
then leveling off as the residual faults become more difficult to uncover.

The basic

assumptions and the data requirement for the model is given as:
1. The cumulative number of failures by time τ, µ(τ), follows a Poisson process with mean
value function µ(τ) = b0 ∗ (1 − ((1 + b1 ∗ τ) ∗ e − b1∗τ )) for b0, b1> 0. This is a bounded,
non-decreasing function of time with limit

lim
µ(τ) = b0 , which is less than infinity
τ→∞

that is, it is a finite failure model.
2. The time between failures of the (i-1) st and the ith failure depends on the time to failure
of the (i-1)st
3. When a failure occurs, the fault, which caused it, is immediately removed and no other
faults are introduced.
The data requirements to implement this model are:
♦ The failure times, ti's, of the software system, or
♦ The number of faults detected, f, in each period of observation of the software along
with the associated lengths li of those periods, i = 1, . . . n.
If data of type 1 are available, the data of the second type can be constructed by first forming
a partition of the time period over which the software is observed and then counting up the
number of faults that fall in each respective period of the partition. As a consequence, this
model can be used for either the time-between-failures data or the number of faults per time
period.
The failure intensity and mean value function is given by:

λ (τ ) = b0 ∗ b12 ∗ τ ∗ e −b1∗τ

µ(τ) = b0 ∗ (1 − ((1 + b1 ∗ τ) ∗ e − b1∗τ ))

(3.15)
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3.2.2

Infinite category model:
For infinite failures category models the number of failures in infinite time is

unbounded. That is for these models

lim
µ (τ ) = ∞ for the mean value function of the
t→∞

process. This means that software will never be completely fault free. This could be by
additional faults being introduced in the software through the error correction process. This
category includes following three models:
1. Duane's model: This model assumes power distribution for the failure data
2. Logarithmic Poisson model: this model assumes geometric distribution for the failure
data.
3. Inverse linear model: this model assumes inverse linear distribution for the failure data
3.2.2.1 Duane's Model:
While at General Electric, Duane noticed that if the cumulative failure rate versus the
cumulative testing time was plotted on Log-Log paper, it tended to follow a straight-line [37].
This process is a NHPP in which the failure intensity function has the same form as the
hazard rate for a Weibull distribution. This model is sometimes referred to as the power
model since the mean value function for the cumulative number of failures by time t is taken
as a power of t, that is, µ (τ ) = b0 ∗ τ b1 for some, b0 > 0 and b1 > 0. This model is an infinite
failure model as

lim
µ (τ ) = ∞ . The basic assumptions and data requirements are:
t→∞

1. The cumulative number of failures by time t, M(t), follows a Poisson process with
mean value function, µ (τ ) = b0 ∗ τ b1 for some, b0 > 0 and b1 > 0.
The data requirements to implement this fault count model are:
♦ Either the actual times that the software failed, t1, t2, . . . tn or the elapsed time
between failures xl, x2, . . . xn, where xi = ti - ti-1 and t0 = 0.
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The failure intensity and mean value function is given as:

λ (τ ) = b0 ∗ b1 ∗ τ b1−1

µ (τ ) = b0 ∗ τ b1

(3.16)

3.2.2.2 Logarithmic Poisson Model:
The logarithmic Poisson proposed by Musa and Okumoto [34] is another model that
has been extensively applied. It is also a NHPP with an intensity function that decreases
exponentially as failures occur. The exponential rate of decrease reflects the view that the
earlier discovered failures have a greater impact on reducing the failure intensity function
than those encountered later. It is called logarithmic because the expected number of failures
over time is a logarithmic function. The assumptions and the data requirements are given
below:
1. The failure intensity decreases exponentially with the expected number of
failures experienced, that is, λ (τ ) =

b0 ∗ b1
.
1 + b1 ∗ τ

2. The cumulative number of failures by time τ, µ(τ), follows a Poisson
process.
Because of assumption 1, it follows that µ (τ ) = b0 ∗ ln(1 + b1 ∗ τ ) and therefore it is clear that
this is an infinite failure model. Data requirements are:
♦ Either the actual times that the software failed, t1, t2, . . . tn or the elapsed time
between failures xl, x2, . . . xn, where xi = ti - ti-1
The failure intensity and mean value function are as:

λ (τ ) =

b0 ∗ b1
1 + b1 ∗ τ

µ (τ ) = b0 ∗ ln(1 + b1 ∗ τ )

(3.17)
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3.2.2.3 Inverse Linear Model:
This model is as special case of Littlewood Verrall model [26]. This is also a type of
infinite failure model as

lim
µ(τ) = ∞ . Data requirements for the model is:
τ→∞

Either the actual times that the software failed, t1, t2, . . . tn or the elapsed time
between failures xl, x2, . . . xn, where xi = ti - ti-1.
The failure intensity and mean value function is given by:

λ (τ ) = b0 ∗

3.3

1
2 ∗ b1 + τ

µ(τ) = b0 ∗ ( b1 + τ − b1)

(3.18)

System Reliability
To determine the reliability of a large system, it needs to be subdivided into smaller

subsystems and elements whose individual reliability factors are known or can be easily
determined.

Depending on the manner in which these subsystems and elements are

connected to constitute the given system, the combination rules of probability can be applied
to obtain system reliability. From the point of view of interconnection of the subsystems, a
system may be classified as a series, parallel, series-parallel, or a complex system.
Finding the exact reliability for series and parallel networks is quite straightforward
and is described briefly in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. A series-parallel network consists of
distinct series and parallel sections within the given network. For such a network the
reliability analysis is performed in steps as described in Section 3.3.3.
A complex network is one, which cannot be completely decomposed into independent
sections of series and/or parallel sub-networks. Reliability analysis for such systems is nontrivial.

As a result, many algorithms resort to simplifying assumptions that produce

approximate solutions [2]-[5].
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3.3.1

Series Systems
Consider a simple system consisting of n units connected in series as shown in the

Figure 3.3 below.

X1

X2

X3

Xn

Figure 3.3 Series System
Let P (Xi) represent the probability of successful operation of unit Xi. For this series system
the system reliability is given by:
Rsys = P (X1 and X2 and . . . Xn)
P (X1) x P (X2 | X1) x P (X3 | (X1 and X2))...P (Xn | (X1 and X2…Xn-1))

(3.19)

Where P (X2 | X1) means the probability of successful operation of unit X2 under the
condition that unit X1 operates successfully. Likewise, P (Xn | (X1 and X2…Xn-1)) means the
probability of successful operation of unit Xn under the condition that all remaining units are
working successfully. If the successful operations of all these units are independent, the
above expression becomes:
i =n

Rsys =

∏ P( Xi)

(3.20)

i =1

3.3.2

Parallel Systems
Consider another simple system consisting of n units connected in parallel as shown

in the Figure 3.4 below.

X1
X2
Xn

Figure 3.4. A Parallel System
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In parallel systems, as opposed to series system, several signal paths perform the same
operation. The satisfactory performance of any of these paths is sufficient to ensure the
successful operation of the system. Let P (Xi) represent the probability of successful
operation of unit Xi. Similarly let P (X’i) represent the probability of failure of unit Xi. For
this parallel system to fail, all the n units must fail. Hence the unreliability of the system is
given by:
Qsys = P (X’1 and X’2 and X’n)
= P (X’l) x P(X’2| X’l) x P(X’3 | (X’l and X’2))...P (Xn | (X 1 …X’ n-1))

(3.21)

Where P (X’2| X’1) means the probability of failure of unit X2 under the condition that unit
X1 also fails. Likewise, P (X’n | (X’1 and X’2 and … X’n-l)) means the probability of failure of
unit Xn under the condition that all remaining units have failed. If the failures of all these
units are independent, then
Qsys = P (X’1) x P (X’2) x P (X’3)... P (X’n)
i =n

Qsys =

∏ P( X ' i)
i =1

The system reliability, Rsys, is given by
i =n

Rsys = 1- ∏ P( X ' i )

(3.22)

i =1

3.3.3

Series-Parallel Systems
An example of a series-parallel system shown in Figure 3.5.
X1
X3
X2
X4

Figure 3.5 Series-Parallel System
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Reliability analysis of such systems is performed in steps.

In each step the

independent series and parallel structures are identified and solved separately. As a result of
each step, the size of the system reduces until it becomes a simple series or parallel system.
In the system of Figure 3.5a, units X3 and X4 are in parallel and thus form a subsystem
identified as subsystem1 and shown in Figure 3.5b.
X3

X4

(a) Figure 3.5a. Subsystem-1

X3
X2
X4

(b) Figure 3.5b. Subsystem-2
Using the expression 3.13 derived for parallel systems, and assuming unit failures as
independent events, the reliability of subsystem1 is found as:
Rsubsys-l = 1 - [1- P (X3)] x [1- P (X4)]
In the next step, note that unit X2 is in series with the subsystem-l. Let the unit X2 and
subsystem-l form a bigger subsystem, which is identified as subsystem2 and shown in Figure
3.5b. Again, assuming the failure of each unit as an independent event, the reliability of
subsystem-2 is given by:
Rsubsys-2 = P(X2) x [1 - {1-P (X3)} x {1- P (X4))]
Finally Xl can be combined in parallel with subsystem-2. The reliability of the overall system
is:
Rsys = 1- P(X1) x {Probability of Failure of subsystem-2}
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Rsys = 1- {1- P (Xl)} x [1- P (X2) x {1- (1- P (X3)) x (1- P (X4)))]
Assuming that all units are identical, i.e. P (X1) = P (X2) = P (X3) = P (X4) = p and
P (X’1) = P (X’2) = P (X’3) = P (X’4) = (1- p),
Rsys = p + 2p2 -3p3 + p4
3.3.4

Complex Systems
A complex system cannot be categorized as a series system or a parallel system or a

combination of series and parallel systems. The analysis of such systems is nontrivial and
requires special algorithms. Figure 3.6 shows a complex system.
c

a

e
b

d

Figure 3.6. A Complex System
The solution of this system is not straightforward. Generally the algorithms to find complex
system reliability are classified into two categories. The first category consists of algorithms,
which produce the exact solution, and the second category consists of the algorithms, which
produce an approximate solution.
The first type of algorithms is complex in nature and involves manipulation with
mathematical expression [6]-[9].

In addition to being complex, they are computation-

intensive, which leads to two problems in implementing these algorithms. The first problem
is concerned with software development that needs some special techniques to overcome the
complexity characteristic of the problem. These techniques especially involve structured
programming, manipulation of lists, and graceful termination of the program under certain
error conditions. The second problem is the limited workspace within the computer system
and is overcome by efficiently utilizing the system memory.

This is accomplished by
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dynamic allocation of memory when needed and immediate release of memory when
finished.
The second type of algorithms produces approximate solution of the reliability
analysis [2]-[5]. These algorithms are not computation-intensive and their implementation is
relatively easy. These algorithms compromise accuracy for a relatively simplified reliability
analysis approach.
In the following sections, however, we will focus on some of the existing techniques
for finding only the exact system reliability for a complex system. A brief description of
these techniques will serve as the background for the research undertaken.
3.3.4.1 Existing Techniques for Complex System Reliability Solution
The conditional probability, cutset, and the tieset techniques give exact reliability
solution and are described in this section
3.3.4.1.1 Conditional Probability Technique
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, complex systems cannot be reduced to simple
series or parallel models, or combinations of these and therefore their reliability cannot be
calculated easily. The concept of conditional probability makes it possible to decompose the
complex system into simple series or parallel systems. Solution of these simple models is
rather straightforward, as explained above.
The Conditional probability P (A | B) is defined as the probability of occurrence of an event
A provided that event B has taken place. If events A and B are independent then
P (A | B) = P(A) and likewise P(B | A) = P(B).
Conditional Probability approach consists of four main steps as outlined below:


Choose a keystone element (say element i )



Obtain the system model when keystone element i works
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Obtain the system model when keystone element i fail.



Calculate the system reliability using the theorem of total probability

Rsys = (Probability that a system works | i works) x P (Xi) + (Probability that a system works |
i fails) x P(X’i)
The following example illustrates this approach. Consider the complex structure shown in
the figure.
Step 1
Element e is chosen as a keystone element. Choose a keystone element such that the system
will reduce to simple series – parallel structure when keystone element is assumed to work or
fail. Sometimes this reduction is not possible in the first iteration. In that case more keystone
element is chosen, one in each step until simple series – parallel structure is not obtained.
Step 2
Assuming the element e is working the model obtain looks like as shown in Figure 3.6a
a

c

b

d

Figure 3.6a Modified System when Keystone Element Works
Step 3
Assuming the element e is not working the model obtained is shown in Figure 3.6b.
a
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d

Figure 3.6b Modified System when Keystone Element Fails
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Step 4
Let p1 denote the probability that system works when element e is working. Also let
Pa, Pb, Pc, and Pd be the probability that the elements a, b, c, and d work, respectively and
these events are mutually independent.
Reliability for the system of Figure 3.6a is then obtained as follows.
P1 =

(Reliability of a and b in parallel) x (Reliability of c and d in parallel)
= [1- (l-Pa) x (l-Pb)] x [1- (l-Pc) X (l-Pd)]
= [1-(1-Pa-Pb+Pa.Pb)] x [1-(1-Pc-Pd+Pc.Pd)]
=[Pa + Pb - Pa .Pb] x [Pc + Pd - Pc .Pd]

Let P2 denote the probability that the system works when element e is not working.
P2

= (Reliability of a and c in series) in parallel with (Reliability of b and d in series)

P2

= 1- (1 –Pa.Pc) x (1 –Pb.Pd)
= l -(l-Pa.Pc-Pb.Pd + Pa.Pb.Pc.Pd)
= Pa.Pc + Pb.Pd – Pa.Pb.Pc.Pd

According to the conditional probability approach, the system reliability is given by:
Rsys = (Probability that system works | e works) x Pe + (Probability that system works | e
fails) x (1- Pe)
Rsys = (P1) x Pe + (P2) x (1- Pe)
(Pa + Pb – Pa.Pb) x (Pc + Pd – Pc.Pd) x Pe + (Pa.Pc+ Pb.Pd – Pa.Pb.Pc.Pd) x (1- Pe)
Assuming that all units are identical, i e Pa = Pb = Pc = Pd = Pe = p
Rsys = (2p- p2) 2 * p + (2p2 -p4) * (1-p)
Rsys = 2p2+2p3 -5p4+2p5
3.3.4.1.2 Cutset Technique
The term cutset means a minimal set of system components which when fail, cause
the system to fail. This technique consists of the following three distinct steps.
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1. Find minimal paths.
2. Find cutsets using the minimal paths found in step 1.
3. Determine the system reliability using cutsets found in step 2.
In this section, techniques to determine minimal cutsets from a set of minimal paths are
described. The exact system reliability is then determined using these cutsets.
Determination of Cutsets from given Minimal Paths
Incidence matrix and Boolean algebra techniques are used to find the cutsets of a
network. A brief description of boolean algebra technique is given under this section
Boolean Algebra Technique:
The Boolean Algebra technique, which is used to find the cutsets of a network, also
assumes that all the minimal paths of the network are known. This technique is simple and
can be easily illustrated through an example. The technique involves some manipulation of
Boolean expressions and therefore is computation-intensive. For the same system discussed
in the previous section, the minimal paths are
Tl =ac, T2=bd, T3 = ade, and T4=bce.
The system will fail if one or more components in each path fail. Hence for T1, either
a or c or both must fail to cause the path to fail. This is expressed as (a + c). Since each path
must fail to cause the system failure, it imposes a Boolean AND condition to find the cutsets.
Hence the expression (a+c) x (b+d) x (a+d+e)x (b+c+e) will give all possible cutsets. To get
the minimal cutsets, Boolean simplification has to be performed on this expression. The
product of the first three terms is
(a+c) x (b+d)x(a+d+e)
= ab+abe+abd+abc+abd+ad+ad+ade + acd + cd + cde + bce
=ab+ad+cd+bce.
Multiplying with the fourth term
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(a+c)x(b+d)x(a+d+e)x(b+c+e)
=(ab+ad+cd+bce) x (b+c+e)
= ab + abe + abc + abd + ade + acd + bcd + cde + cd + bce + bce + bce
=ab + cd + ade + bce.
Therefore ab, cd, ade, and bce are the minimal cutsets for the given network.
Reliability Computation using Cutsets
A system fails if all the components of any of its cutsets fail. This concept is
represented by a reliability block diagram using cutsets as shown in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7. Cutset Reliability Block Diagram
Let P (Ci) be the probability of occurrence of cutset i. It is the same as the probability of
failure of all elements in cutset i.
Qsys

= P (C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 ∪ C4)
= [P (Cl) + P (C2) + P (C3) + P (C4)]
=[P (C1∩ C2) + P (C1∩ C3) + P (C1∩ C4) + P (C2 ∩C3) + P (C2 ∩ C4) + P (C3
∩C4)] [P (C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C3) + P (C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C4) + P (C1 ∩ C3 ∩ C4) +P (C2 ∩ C3
∩ C4)] - [P (C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C3 ∩ C4)].

Assuming that Qa, Qb, Qc, Qd, and Qe are the probabilities for failure of element a, b, c, d,
and e respectively, terms in the above expression are computed as follows.
P (C1) = Qa.Qb
P (C2) = Qc.Qd
P (C3) = Qa.Qd.Qe
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P (C4) = Qb.Qc.Qe
P (C1∩ C2) = Qa.Qb.Qc.Qd
P (C1∩ C3) = Qa.Qb.Qd.Qe
P (Cl ∩ C4) = Qa.Qb.Qc.Qe
P (C2 ∩ C3) = Qa.Qc.Qd.Qe
P (C2 ∩ C4) = Qb.Qc.Qd.Qe
P (C3 ∩ C4) = Qa.Qb.Qc.Qd.Qe
P (Cl ∩ C2 ∩ C3)= Qa.Qb.Qc.Qd.Qe
P (C1∩C2 ∩ C4)= Qa.Qb.Qc.Qd.Qe
P (C1∩ C3 ∩ C4)= Qa.Qb.Qc.Qd.Qe
P (C2 ∩ C3 ∩ C4)= Qa.Qb.Qc.Qd.QP
P (C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C3 ∩ C4) =Qa.Qb.Qc.Qd.Qe
If all units are identical and Qa = Qb = Qc = Qd = Qe = Q = (1-p),
Q

= (2Q2 + 2Q3) - (5Q4 + Q5) + (4Q5) (Q5)
= 2Q2+2Q3 -5Q4+2Q5
= 2(1-p)2+2(1-p)3-5(1-p)4+2(1-p)5
= 1-2p2 -2p3+5p4-2p5

Rsys = (1-Qsys) = 1-(1-2p2-2p3+5p4 -2p5)
= 2p2+2p3 -5p4+2p5
3.3.4.1.3 Tieset Technique
The term tieset is defined as a minimal set of working components that cause the system
to work. Finding the exact system reliability using the tieset technique consists of the
following two steps:
1. Find the tiesets for a given complex network.
2. Determine the system reliability using the tiesets found in step 1.
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Determination of Tiesets
The Node Removal and Matrix Multiplication techniques are used to determine the
tiesets of a network. Brief descriptions of these techniques are discussed below.
Node Removal Technique
Before introducing this technique, the connection matrix is defined as follows. It is a matrix,
which shows the interconnection between all nodes of the system. The order of this square
matrix is equal to the number of nodes of the system. An entry in position (i,j) where i not
equal to j represents the element that allows signals to pass from node i to node j. An entry of
zero means either node i and j are not physically connected or, if they are connected,
information cannot flow from node i to node j. All principal diagonal elements of this matrix
are 1.To illustrate the construction of the connection matrix, the system of Figure 3.5 is
considered again. The signal flow directions are marked and the nodes are numbered as
shown in Figure 3.8. Note that the elements a, b, c, and d are unidirectional and can allow
information to flow in one direction only. On the other hand, element e is bi-directional. The
connection matrix representing this circuit is shown in Figure 3.9.
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Figure 3.8 A Complex Network
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Figure 3.9. A Connection Matrix
In this technique all nodes that are not input or output nodes are removed from the
connection matrix. As a result, the connection matrix is reduced to a 2x2 matrix whose row
numbers represent the source nodes and column numbers represents the destination nodes.
The entry (i,j) that corresponds to the source node i and destination node j represents all
tiesets from node i to node j. The process of removing a node, say node k, from the
connection matrix involves removal of kth row and kth column from the connection matrix.
All elements in the reduced matrix are modified such that
Ni,j(new) = Ni,j(old) + Ni,k(old) x N k, j(old) where i ≠ k, j ≠ k
For example, to determine the tiesets from node 1 to 4, node 2 and node 3 are removed from
the connection matrix.
Elements after removal of Node 2
N1,1(new) = N l,l(old) + N1,2(old) x N2 l(old) = 1 +a.0 = 1
Nl,3(new) = Nl,3(old) + Nl,2(old) x N2,3(old) = b+ a .e
N1,4(new) = a.c
N3, 1(new) = 0
N3, 4(new) = d + e.c
N4,1(new) = 0
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N4,3(new) = 0
N4,4(new)= b + a.e
The modified connection matrix is,
To Node

1

3

4

1

1

b + a.e

a.c

3

0

1

d+ c.e

4

0

0

1

From Node

Elements after removal of node 3
The resulting connection matrix after removal of node 3 is
To Node

From Node

1

4

1

1

a.c +b.d + b.c.e +a.d.e + a.c.e

4

0

1

N1,4 is reduced using Boolean simplifications. Hence,
N1,4 = ac + bd+ bce + ade which represents all tiesets from node 1 to node 4.
Reliability Computation using Tiesets
From the definition of the tieset it is clear that the system will work only if all the
components in at least one of the tiesets work. The relationship between all the tiesets is
expressed by the reliability block diagram shown in Figure 3.10. For the stem shown in
Figure 28, the tiesets for node 1 to node 4 are T1 = ac, T2 = bd, T3 = ade, and T4 = bce.
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Figure 3.10 Tieset Reliability Block Diagram
P (Ti) be the probability of occurrence of tieset i. It is the same as the probability t all
elements in tieset i work.
Rsys

= P (T1 ∪ T2 ∪ Τ3 ∪ Τ4)
= [P (Tl) + P (T2) + P (T3) + P (T4)]
=[P (T1 ∩ T2) + P (T1 ∩ T3) + P (TI ∩ T4) + P (T2 ∩ T3) + P (T2 ∩ T4) +
P (T3 ∩ T4)] + [P (T1 ∩ Τ2 ∩ T3) + P (T1 ∩ T2 ∩ T4) + P (T1 ∩ Τ3 ∩ Τ4) +
P (T2 ∩ T3 ∩ T4)] - [P (T1 ∩ T2 ∩ T3 ∩ T4)].

Let Ra, Rb, Rc, Rd, and Re denote the probabilities of success of element a, b, c, d, and e,
respectively. The terms in the above expression are computed as follows.
P (T1) = Ra.Rb
P (T2) = Rc.Rd
P (T3) = Ra.Rd.Re
P (T4) = Rb.Rc.Re
P (T1∩ T2) = Ra.Rb.Rc.Rd
P (T1∩Τ3) = Ra.Rb.Rd.Re
P (Tl ∩ T4) = Ra.Rb.Rc.Re
P (T2 ∩ T3) = Ra.Rc.Rd.Re
P (T2 ∩ T4) = Rb.Rc.Rd.Re
P (T3 ∩ T4) = Ra.Rb.Rc.Rd.Re
P (Tl ∩ T2 ∩ T3)= Ra.Rb.Rc.Rd.Re
P (T1∩ T2 ∩ T4)= Ra.Rb.Rc.Rd.Re
44

P (T1∩ T3 ∩ T4)= Ra.Rb.Rc.Rd.Re
P (T2 ∩ T3 ∩ T4)= Ra.Rb.Rc.Rd.Re
P (T1 ∩ T2 ∩ T3 ∩ T4) =Ra.Rb.Rc.Rd.Re
If all units are identical and Ra = Rb = Rc = Rd = Re = p, then
Rsys

= (2p2 + 2p3) – (5p4 +p5) +(4p5) – (p5)
= (2p2 +2p3) – (5p4) +(2p5)

3.4

Computer Algorithm for Calculating Reliability
As described, the above discussion, it is seen that estimating reliability of a complex

system is not a straightforward task and hence to deal with this kind of problems, a computer
algorithm is described in this section. The simplicity of the algorithm is that it uses sequence
of prediction equations, which provides increasingly closer bounds on the system reliability.
This algorithm will use the tieset and cutset determined from one of the techniques
discussed above. Let Ti, i = 1,2…n be the number of tiesets. Let Cj, j = 1,2 …m be number of
cutset. The preceding statements for system reliability Rsys can be expressed as follows:
Rsys =Pr {T1•T2 •…•Tn} = Pr {at least one tieset is good}
Expressed in terms of cutsets
Rsys = Pr {C1∪ C2 ∪… ∪ Cn}
= Pr {all cut sets are good, viz. contain at least one element of the set which is operative}
Equivalently, the unreliability is expressed as
1 − R sys = Pr{T1 ⋅ T2 ...Tn } = Pr {all tiesets have failure} or
1 − R sys = Pr{C1 + C 2 + ... + C m } = Pr {at least one cut occurs}
Where Tn and C m are the complements of the events Tn and Cm, respectively.
From the above exact reliability expressions bounds can be obtained by using the basic
probabilistic inequalities
45

Rsys = Pr{T1 + T2 + … + Tn } ≤ ∑ Pr{Ti }
Rsys = Pr {T1 + T2 + … + Tn } ≥ ∑ Pr{Ta } −

∑ Pr{Ti

i< j

⋅ T j } 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n

Thus an upper bound RU1 and a lower bound RL1 to the reliability are;
R U1 = ∑ Pr{Ti }

RL1 = ∑ Pr{Ti } −

(3.23)
∑ Pr{Ti

i< j

⋅Tj }

(3.24)

In the same manner another upper bound is obtained as;

RU 2 = ∑ Pr{Ti } −

∑ Pr{Ti

i< j

⋅Tj} +

∑

i < j <k

Pr{Ti ⋅ T j ⋅ Tk } 1 ≤ i, j , k ≤ n

Similarly inequalities can be applied to cutsets to obtain another lower limit;
R sys ≤ ∑ Pr{C j } thus,
R L 2 = 1 − ∑ Pr{C j } and by using two terms we get another upper limit;

RU 3 = 1 − ∑ Pr{C j } +

∑ Ci

i< j

⋅ C j 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m

Thus by using the equations of tieset and cutset series of upper bounds and lower bounds are
generated which when converge provides the actual system reliabty.
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&KDSWHU
'HVLJQDQG'HYHORSPHQWRI6RIWZDUH
The software described in this chapter was developed to facilitate the
calculation of reliability of a product or a system using the theories and models described in
Chapter 3. Apart from calculating the reliability of a product or a system, it also provides
useful statistical information, which helps user to select the best model for a particular set of
a failure data.
The software is an integration of three different modules, which are used for
estimation of hardware reliability, software reliability and system reliability. Apart from the
three different parts, there is also reliability calculator, which helps in determining hardware
reliability using the inputs from user.
4.1

Software Development Tools
The software is implemented using Microsoft Visual Basic5.

As Microsoft’s

premium programming language, Visual Basic5 is the easiest object-oriented programming
approach for application development.

It is a sophisticated front end, which has some

powerful windows features. The other end is the backend, which the user does not interact
with, but this is the part of the software that interacts with the front end. Thus, the front end
has the unique ability of interacting with both the user and the backend of software. The Jet
Database Engine was used to establish such a connection. Visual Basic5 program has
several outstanding features that have made it an efficient tool for application development.
It essentially consists of Forms or Screens, which are any normal screen. In Visual Basic5,
the programmer builds the forms. These forms are similar to the screens displayed by
Windows 95, 98/NT, such as log-on dialog box shown at the start up. The only difference is
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that the programmer chooses how these dialog boxes appear, when they appear, and what
they do. Control Buttons or Toolbox Controls are a set of controls that are used on the
custom designed forms. Table 4.1 provides a set of toolbox controls that have been used on
the forms to arrive at the desired results in this software. Control Buttons are located in the
toolbox and are dragged with the help of the mouse and placed on the screen or form. The
positioning of these control buttons are often specified by the software designer.
Table 4.1: Toolbox Controls Used in this Software

Control

Use/Description

Text Box

Displays and allows data entry.

Label

Displays plain text on forms, such as captions for other
controls.
Initiates an action.

Command Button.
Frame

Group controls that are related in same way; also displays
group of option buttons.

MS -Flex Grid

In the form of columns and rows, used to display the input
data.
Used to display graphs.

MS- Chart Control
Option Button

Implemented in groups, lets the user make a choice for a
small number of options

A number of other controls are also used. The controls are described individually in
the forms, where they are used. The Code Window, which is screened for the user, is the
driving force behind the software. Another property of Visual Basic5 that was used in this
project is the Grid Control. Grid Controls are the same as any other Visual Basic5 control
objects, except that they may have been given additional properties, events, and methods that
allow the user to display the data from the respective data file. The Grid makes it easy to
create data-aware input and display data that the user can use to perform the estimation of
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reliability.

Another feature of this software is that it uses Chart control, which when

connected with the columns of the Grid control x-y plots.
4.2

Software Description
Various forms constitute the building block of the software.

These forms and

associated code allows the user to input the data and estimate the reliability. The forms have
a .frm extension. The toolbox controls as described in Table 4.1 are used as required to
construct these links. The forms are described as they appear in the program. The code is
shown in Appendix F.
•

Menu Form.

Figure 4.1 Menu Screen
When the software is started the user sees the above Menu form on the screen of
computer. Like any other Windows application, this form also has menus for controlling
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complete software. Under the menu “File”, there are various submenus like “Open”, “Print”,
“Close” and “Exit”. Clicking the “Open” submenu allows selecting which part of software
user wants to execute. “Print” submenu prints the specified form. “Close” submenu will
close a particular form and “Exit” submenu terminates the software.

Apart from the

submenus described above, the other important submenu is “Data Editor” which will be
discussed as separate form. Under the Menu “Tools” is Reliability Calculator. Since this
software was designed similar to other typical software available in the market, it allows the
user to open more than one form at the same time and hence there arises need to arrange the
forms in a particular fashion. Under “Windows” Menu, user can select the manner in which
the forms need to be arranged (Cascade, Tile or as icons). Other important feature of the
software is the provision of “Help” Menu that allows the user to learn about the feature and
the usage of any particular form.
•

Data Editor
Like any other editor available in the market, Data Editor is a text editor for this

particular software. User can enter the failure data of hardware or software product and can
save the file with an extension “hrd” or “sft” respectively. Since the data editor has an
interface with the system (desktop) user can anytime recall the data file and make changes to
the file. The extension “hrd” and “sft” allows the user to distinguish between hardware
product data file and software failure data file. As the software is also meant for calculating
the system reliability, user can also input the matrix for tieset, cutset and component
reliability and save these files with extension “tst”, “cst” and “rel” respectively. The data file
stored through the data editor is then recalled in the respective application for further
evaluation of the data.
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Figure 4.2 Data Editor Screen
•

Hardware Reliability Screen
This screen opens when the user clicks the hardware reliability option under “open”

submenu. This screen helps the user in specifying information about the failure data. On the
screen there is a file control provision. This allows the user to select the data file for the
particular hardware product. When the selected file is open, user can see the data in the data
grid. Data grid is only for displaying the data, user cannot edit the data through a data grid.
If user wants to edit the data, the data file has to be opened in the "Data Editor". User can
then select the distribution. This selection is possible through the object “option button. One
distribution at a time can be selected. On clicking “hardware reliability” button, program
calculates the parameters for that particular distribution and also the reliability of the product
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for a specified mission time. The output of the program is displayed in the object “label”.
User can then play with data for different distribution and compare the output. Also user can
print the screen by selecting the print option under “File” menu. “Clear All” button allows
the user to erase all the previously calculated information and start afresh with new data file.

Figure 4.3 Hardware Reliability Screen
•

Software Reliability
Like hardware reliability this screen is designed to analyze the software failure data.

The software reliability screen looks similar to the hardware reliability screen. This is done
to maintain homogeneity and to increase the user friendliness of the software. Here also there
is provision for opening the failure data file and selecting the different distributions. By
clicking on the “Failure intensity” button, the program calculates the failure intensity for that
particular software failure data. There is also provision for calculating the future failure
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intensity. This helps the user to know how long the software product has to be tested. This
screen also displays the graphical behavior of the fitted distribution. This is achieved with
the special control “MS-Chart Control”. For this the two columns of the data grid are

designated as X-axis and Y-axis, and then the graph is plotted between them.

Figure 4.4 Software Reliability Screen
•

Result Screen
This Screen is associated with the software reliability screen. It cannot be called from

the menu bar provided. Once the software reliability screen is executed to analyze the failure
data, then result screen can be called by clicking the “Detailed Results” button. On this
screen all of the necessary information related to the analyzed data is displayed. Data grid is
used to display the failure intensity and the reliability of the software at the end of a particular
test time. Also some important statistical information pertaining to the data is displayed. On
clicking the “Graph” button user is able to see various graphs related with the analyzed data.
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Figure 4.5 Result Screen
•

System Reliability Screen
This screen is designed to calculate the reliability of a complex system. The setup of

this screen is similar to hardware reliability or software reliability screen. When user selects
system reliability from the Menu, this screen shows up. There are three separate file controls
in this screen, which enables the user to select the respective tieset file, cutset file and
component reliability file. Once the files are selected, with the click of the command button
“system reliability”, program calculates the system reliability for that set of inputs by using
the algorithm in chapter 3. The text boxes are used to display the intermediate iterations as
well as final reliability of the system. There is also an option to display the final system
reliability from two- decimal place to five - decimal places.
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Figure 4.6 System Reliability Screen
•

Reliability Calculator Screen
This screen was designed to calculate the hardware reliability of a product. It can be

found under the menu “Tools”.

Here a user can input the parameter for a particular

distribution. There is no provision for failure data input and hence this screen can only be
used when user is aware of parameters of a particular distribution. It becomes easier for the
user if reliability has to be calculated for different mission time using the same failure data.
Four different distributions are given in the screen.
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Figure 4.7 Reliability Calculator Screen
•

Input Boxes and Message boxes.
Input box is a special feature of Visual Basic which allows the user to input data.

Input of data can also be possible through the use of text boxes but advantage of using input
boxes is user can never miss to enter the critical values, as returning the input box as “blank”
will not initiate the code or the program. In this way by using the features of Visual Basic, it
is made sure that user always provides the critical information needed for calculation. Figure
4.8 shows the use of input box for entering the critical data used for estimating reliability.
Like input box, message box is another special feature of Visual Basic, which allows the
software to display any critical message during run–time to the user. Message box can be
used to give warnings like user has entered wrong data values or it can be used to give some
useful information. Figure 4.9 shows how the message box has been incorporated in the
software to make the software more robust.
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Figure 4.8 Use of Input Box

Figure 4.9 Use of Message Box
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Thus using the flexibility provided by the visual basic and using the object-oriented
feature of the Visual Basic software, it was made possible to design an application to estimate
the reliability for not only hardware or software products but also for complex systems.
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&KDSWHU
,PSOHPHQWDWLRQDQG9DOLGDWLRQRI6RIWZDUH
This chapter presents the application of the software tool described in Chapter 4. For
hardware reliability module, test cases for different distribution from the literature were run.
For software reliability same set of failure data was used to run for different models to see
which model is the "best". Also for software reliability, the models were implemented in
MATHCAD software package for verification. And for the system reliability, different
systems varying from simple series–parallel, to complex systems, having more than 10
components were studied.
5.1

Hardware Reliability Validation.
In this section examples for different hardware distribution will be described

and the results obtained will be compared with the ones existing in the literature.
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Exponential Model
The following are complete data representing the number of minutes required to perform
corrective maintenance on a jet engine.
50.1

20.9

31.1

96.5

36.3

99.1

42.6

4.6

2.5

1.8

11.5

84.6

88.6

10.7

84.9

6.2

32.0

30.4

87.7

14.2

Estimator for the exponential distribution is given by

λ=

n
Where n = number of failures and T = cumulative test time
T

λ = 0.02389 And MTTF = 41.85 Hr .
Using the expression for reliability R = e −λ ⋅t where t = mission time for which
reliability has to be calculated. For t = 15 hrs, and plugging the value of λ = 0.02389, we get
the reliability as 0.698. For exponential a specific statistic test, Bartlett’s test, was used to
check weather the failure data fits the distribution. The complete theory of Bracelet’s test is
shown in Appendix A. The test statistic is given by
n
 

 n 





2 ⋅ n ⋅ ln (1 / n )⋅ ∑ t i − (1 / n )⋅ ∑ ln(t i ) 
 



i =1
 i =1  



B=
1 + (n + 1) / (6 ⋅ n )

Using the values of n and ti we get, B = 18.258. As the test statistic under the null
hypothesis has a chi-squared distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom, the failure times will
follow exponential distribution if;
χ2 (1-α/2,n-1) < B< χ2 (α/2,n-1).
Assuming α =0.10 and using the standard Chi Squared table, values on lower and
upper bounds were found to be 10.1 and 30.1 respectively. As the value of B falls within the
range, the distribution is proved to be exponential. Doing this example by hand involves lot
60

of tedious calculation, but when the same set of failure data is run in the software, it gives the
accurate results as shown in Figure 5.1.

Figure5.1 Demonstration of Hardware Exponential Model
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Log-Normal Model
The time to failure of hose assemblies, due to structural fatigue and chemical breakdown, is
believed to have a log-normal distribution. The following 25 failure times were obtained from
environmental stress testing.
240.5

511.8

1083.4

821.3

1725.4

629.4

326.9

964.8

1677.8

282.3

652.3

639.2

1847.8

670.8

338.8

818.1

1407.5

4991.0

452.0

464.9

734.9

220.2

1078.1

1077.3

1773.0
Estimator of lognormal distribution are given by,
n

ln(t i )
n
i =1

t med = e µ Where µ = ∑
n

And s =

∑ (ln(ti ) − µ ) 2

i =1

n

tmed=765.426 and s=0.725. Using the expression of hazard rate function reliability is
1  t
then calculated as, R(t ) = 1 − φ  ⋅ ln
 s  t med


  , where t is the mission time for which the



reliability has to be calculated. For t = 333, we get reliability as 0.8744
For lognormal distribution general test statistic, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, is used to
see weather the data fits the distribution. The complete procedure for Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test is shown in Appendix B. The test statistic is given by;
Dn = max{D1 , D2 }
  t − t  i −1
i
 t − t 
 and D2 =  − φ  i
where D1 =  φ  i
−
 
n 
 s 
  s 
n
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The failure data will follow Log-Normal distribution when
Dn < Dcrit , where D

crit

is a value found from the standard Kolmogorov -Smirnov

Table. Value of α is assumed by user.
For this particular data max D1 and max D2 are 0.122 and 0.1288. And hence Dn for
this data is 0.076. Assuming α =0.10 and using the standard Kolmogorov-Smirnov table,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov value was found out to be 0.165. As the calculated value is less than
the critical value the set of failure data fits Log-Normal distribution. As seen from the Figure
5.2, same values are achieved.

Figure5.2 Demonstration of Hardware Log-Normal model
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Normal Model
The following 15 observations represent a sample of repair times, in hours, of a complex
piece of machinery.
61.6

70.0

78.4

84.3

73.0

65.5.

75.3

83.5

72.3

65.1

77.1

83.2

63.4

72.7

72.5

Estimators of normal distribution are given as;

µ = T / n Where, T is total test time and n number of failure data.
And σ 2 = (n − 1) ⋅ s 2 / n where, s is population variance and standard deviation is σ.
µ =73.20346 and σ =7.041221 Using the expression of hazard rate function reliability
t −µ 
is then calculated as, R(t ) = 1 − φ 
 , where t is the mission time for which the reliability
 σ 
has to be calculated. Assuming t = 65, we get reliability as 0.8691
For Normal distribution general test statistic, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, is used to see
weather the data fits the distribution. The complete procedure for Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
is shown in Appendix B. The test statistic is given by;
Dn = max{D1 , D2 }
 t −t
where D1 =  φ  i
  s

i
 i −1
 t − t 
 and D2 =  − φ  i
−
 
n 

 s 
n

The failure data will follow Log-Normal distribution when
Dn < Dcrit , where D

crit

is a value found from the standard Kolmogorov -Smirnov

Table. Value of α is assumed by user.
For this particular data max D1 and max D2 are 0.119 and 0.122. And hence the Dn
for this data set is 0.122. Assuming α =0.10 and using the standard Kolmogorov-Smirnov
table, Kolmogorov-Smirnov value was found out to be 0.201. As the calculated value is less
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than the critical value the set of failure data fits Normal distribution.. As seen from the Figure
5.3, same values are achieved.

Figure5.3 Demonstration of Hardware Normal Model
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Weibull Model
The following failure items were obtained from the testing 15 units until each had failed
112.2 139.8 156.8 113.6 75.5

88.5

73.9

95.5

218

25.1

403.1 150.3

164.5 138.5 151.9.
Estimator for Weibull distribution is given as,
n

∑ tiβ ⋅ ln(ti )

i =1

n

∑ tiβ

1 1 n
− − ⋅ ∑ ln(t i ) = 0 .
β n i =1

i =1

The above equation is solved using Newton-Raphson Method (Appendix D)
1 n β
And θ =  ⋅ ∑ t i
n
 i =1

1

β




β= 1.8027 and θ =161.4. . Using the expression of hazard rate function reliability is

then calculated as, R(t )

t
− 
= e θ 

β

where t is the mission time for which the reliability has to

be calculated. Assuming t = 100, we get reliability as 0.66
For Weibull a specific statistic test, Mann’s test, is used to check weather the failure
data fits the distribution. The complete theory of Mann’s test is shown in Appendix C. The
test statistic is given by
k1 ⋅
M =

n −1

∑ (ln(ti +1 ) − ln(ti ))/ M i

i = k 1+ 1
k1

k 2 ⋅ ∑ (ln(t i +1 ) − ln(t i ) ) / M i
i =1

Solving for this particular set of data the value of M comes out to be 1.473. The failure data
will follows Weibull distribution when
M<F (α,ν1,ν2) where F-critical may be obtained from the F-distribution table.
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For this particular data ν1,ν2 are 14. Assuming α =0.05 and using the standard F-distribution
table, F value was found out to be 2.484. As the calculated value is less than the critical value
the set of failure data fits Weibull distribution. As seen from the Figure 5.4, same values are
achieved.

Figure5.4 Demonstration of Hardware Weibull Model
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5.2

Software Reliability Validation.
To test the software reliability module, existing data [36], is used. The data recorded

in CPU seconds, is time between failures, converted to cumulative failure times, with failures
being experienced at times t1, t2…tme, for total of me failures. The total time of observation or
testing is denoted by te, which in the example given below does not correspond with last
failure. Since the literature does show the results for all the models used in the developed
software, all the models were run in MATHCAD and the results are then compared with the
one obtained by running the software tool. The failure data is listed as below;
3

33

146

227

342

351

353

444

556

571

709

759

836

860

968

1056

1726

1846

1872

1986

2311

2366

2608

2676

3098

3278 3288

4434

5034

5049

5085

5089

5089

5097

5324

5389

5565

5623 6080 6380

6477

6740

7192

7447

7644

7837

7843

7922

8738

10089 10237 10258 10491 10625 10982 11175 11411 11442 11811 12559

12559 12791 13121 13486 14708 15251 15261 15277 15806 16185 16229 16358
17168 17458 17758 18287 18568 18728 19556 20567 21012 21308 23063 24127
25910 26770 27753 28460 28493 29361 30085 32408 35338 36799 37642 37654
37915 39715 40508 42015 42045 42188 42296 42296 45406 46653 47596 48296
49171 49416 50145 52042 52489 52875 53321 53443 54433 55381 56463 56485
56560 57042 62551 62651 62661 63732 64103 64893 71043 74364 75409 76057
81542 82702 84566 88682.
End of testing occurs at 91208.
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Exponential Distribution
Estimation of Parameters:
TNF TNF ∗ TET TNF
− b1∗TET
− ∑ TTF j = 0
b1
e
− 1 j =1
b0 =

TNF
1 − e −b1∗TET

b1 = 3.841 ∗ 10 −5

b0 = 141.932 faults

Calculation of Failure Intensity:

λ (τ ) = b0 ∗ b1 ∗ e −b1∗τ

λ (88682) = 2.23 ∗ 10 −4 failures/CPU Secs

Calculation of Reliability
Let the mission time be 500 and reliability is calculated after the last failure has occurred.
R(τ ) = e −(λ (τ ) ⋅500) R =0.893
Calculation of Square of Errors
N

SSE = ∑ (oi − ei ) 2 Where o is observed number failure at the time i and e is the expected
i =1

number of failure at the time i. SSE = 8968.33
Apart from the giving some statistical information, U-Plot is also graphed by the
software. U-plot is one mode of predictive analysis. The graph representing the U-plot is
line of a unit slope. Any serious departure of the plot from this line is indicative of nonuniformity of the model to that data. The complete explanation of U-plot is given in
Appendix E. The result from the software is shown in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5 Demonstration of Software Exponential Distribution
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Weibull Distribution
Estimation of Parameters:
b0 =

TNF
1 − e b1∗TET

b0=136 faults

b2

TNF

b1 =

− (b0 − TNF ) ∗ TET b 2 +

TNF

∑ TTF j b2

b1 = 8.553 ∗ 10 −10

j =1

Calculation of Failure Intensity and Expected Number of Failure:

λ (τ ) = b0 ∗ b1 ∗ b2 ∗ τ b 2−1 ∗ e −b1∗τ

b2

λ (88682) = .00002 failures/CPU Secs

Calculation of Reliability
Let the mission time be 500 and reliability is calculated after the last failure has occurred.
R(τ ) = e −(λ (τ ) ⋅500) R =0.988
Calculation of Square of Errors
N

SSE = ∑ (oi − ei ) 2 Where o is observed number failure at the time i and e is the expected
i =1

number of failure at the time i. SSE = 97656.6
The result from the software is shown in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6 Demonstration of Software Weibull Distribution
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Gamma Distribution
Estimation of Parameters:
2 ∗ TNF TNF ∗ TET ∗ b1 ∗ TET TNF
− b1∗TET
− ∑ TTF j = 0
b1
e
− 1 − b1 ∗ TET
j =1
b0 =

TNF

b1 = 7.927 ∗ 10 −5

b0 = 136.82 faults

1 − (1 + b1 ∗ TET ) ∗ e −b1∗TET

Calculation of Failure Intensity:

λ (τ ) = b0 ∗ b12 ∗ τ ∗ e −b1∗τ

λ (88682) = 0.00007 failures/CPU Secs

Calculation of Reliability
Let the mission time be 500 and reliability is calculated after the last failure has occurred.
R(τ ) = e −(λ (τ ) ⋅500) R =0.967
Calculation of Square of Errors
N

SSE = ∑ (oi − ei ) 2 Where o is observed number failure at the time i and e is the expected
i =1

number of failure at the time i SSE = 41992.3.

Figure 5.7 Demonstration of Software Gamma Distribution
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Power Distribution
Estimation of Parameters:
TNF TNF
+ ∑ ln(TTF j ) − TNF ∗ ln(TET ) = 0
b1
j =1
b0 =

b1=0.474

TNF

TET b1
Calculation of Failure Intensity:

λ (τ ) = b0 ∗ b1 ∗ τ b1−1

b0=0.603 failures

λ (88682) = 0.00072 failures/CPU Secs

Calculation of Reliability
Let the mission time be 500 and reliability is calculated after the last failure has occurred.
R(τ ) = e −(λ (τ ) ⋅500) R =0.6984
Calculation of Square of Errors
N

SSE = ∑ (oi − ei ) 2 Where o is observed number failure at the time i and e is the expected
i =1

number of failure at the time i. SSE = 7709.368
The result from the software is shown in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8 Demonstration of Software Power Distribution
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Geometric Distribution
Estimation of Parameters:
 TNF
1

 ∑ 1 + b1 ∗ TTF j
 j =1
b0 =

 1
TNF ∗ TET
∗ −
=0
 b1 (1 + b1 ∗ TET ) ∗ ln(1 + b1 ∗ TET )


TNF
ln(1 + b1 ∗ TET )

b1 = 2.623 ∗ 10 −4

b0 = 42.293 faults

Calculation of Failure Intensity:

λ (τ ) =

b0 ∗ b1
1 + b1 ∗ τ

λ (88682) = 0.00051 failure/CPU Secs

Calculation of Reliability
Let the mission time be 500 and reliability is calculated after the last failure has occurred.
R(τ ) = e −(λ (τ ) ⋅500) R =0.7761
Calculation of Square of Errors
N

SSE = ∑ (oi − ei ) 2 Where o is observed number failure at the time i and e is the expected
i =1

number of failure at the time i. SSE = 2467.94
The result from the software is shown in Figure 5.9.
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Figure 5.9 Demonstration of Software Geometric Distribution
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Inverse -Linear Distribution.

Estimation of Parameters:
1
− 2 
∗

3  b1 + TTF j
j =1

TNF

∑

b0 =

 1 

 − ∗  TNF ∗ b1 + TET − b1  = 0
 2 
b1 + TET − b1 



TNF

b1 = 1.152

b0 = 0.452 Faults

b1 + TET − b1

Calculation of Failure Intensity:

λ (τ ) = b0 ∗

1

λ (88682) = 0.00076 failures/CPU Secs

2 ∗ b1 + τ

Calculation of Reliability
Let the mission time be 500 and reliability is calculated after the last failure has occurred.
R(τ ) = e −(λ (τ ) ⋅500) R =0.6843
Calculation of Square of Errors
N

SSE = ∑ (oi − ei ) 2 Where o is observed number failure at the time i and e is the expected
i =1

number of failure at the time i. SSE = 11457.86
The result from the software is shown in Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10 Demonstration of Software Inverse Linear Distribution
From the above runs in MATHCAD and the software developed, SSE for geometric model is
the least and hence it has the better fit for the data then the remaining models. The fact that
geometric model is better for the set of data has also been mentioned in the literature [34].
The analysis in the literature is based on the graphical evaluation of the models.
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5.3

System Reliability Validation.
This section presents the results of various kinds of networks analyzed using the

software tool developed. The results from the software tool are then compared with the
existing solution. The examples analyzed are:
(a) Simple Series-Parallel network
(b) Ladder Network and
(c) A system from Nelson, Batts &Beadles. [3]
Simple Series Parallel Network
Consider the network as shown in the Figure 5.11. The probabilities of success for each of
the component is given as Pr{1}=0.93, Pr{2}=0.86, Pr{3}=0.92, Pr{4}=0.95, Pr{5}=0.98.
1
3

5

2
4

Figure 5.11 Series Parallel Network
As the network shown is simple, manual reliability calculation is shown which uses formulae
used for calculating series and parallel function. An assumption is that there is statistical
independence between the components.
Step1
Component 3 and component 4 are in parallel and the reliability of that block is given by
R1 = (1 − (1 − Pr(3) ) ⋅ (1 − Pr(4) )) . R1 = 0.996. Below is the diagram of system after step1
1
5
2

R1

Figure 5.11-a Series Parallel Network
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Step 2
From figure 511-a, component 2 and R1 are in series and the reliability for that block is,
R 2 = R1 ⋅ Pr(2) , R2 =0.9268. Block diagram after step 2 is shown below
1
5
R2

Figure 5.11-b Series Parallel Network
Step3
Component R1 and 1 are in parallel and reliability is given by,
R3 = (1 − (1 − Pr(1) ) ⋅ (1 − R 2) )) ; R3 = 0.9896. Block diagram after step 3 is shown below
R3

5

Figure 5.11-c Series Parallel Network
Step 4
Component 5 and R3 are in series thus reducing the system to one component having the
reliability equivalent to the reliability of system.
R 4 = R1 ⋅ Pr(5) ; R4 = 0.96988
R4

Figure 5.11-d Series Parallel Network (Final)
For calculating the reliability of the above network using the software developed, algorithm
described in section 3.4 of Chapter 3 was used. The inputs for the software are tieset matrix,
cutset matrix and component reliability matrix. The tieset and cutset for the network are
given below,
Tiesets: T1 {2,5}, T2 {1.3,5}, and T3 {1,4,5}.
Cutsets: C1 {1,2}, C2 {2,3,4}, and C3 {5}.
The result from the software is shown in Figure 5-12.
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Figure 5-12: System Reliability for Example1 Using the Developed Software.
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Ladder Network
Figure 5-13 -a describes two-stage ladder network. Systems like this cannot be solved by
applying simple series parallel rule, as linkages with component E will not permit definition
of a subset of components that are strictly in series or in parallel. This kind of system is
analyzed using decomposition method.

C

A

A

C

E

B

B

D

a: System Block diagram

D

b: Component E works

A

C

B

D

c: Component E Fails

Figure 5-13:Two Stage Ladder Network
Decomposition Method
Two sub-networks are created: one shown in figure 5.13-b, in which component E is assumed
to be functioning and one Figure5.13-c, in which E has failed. The system reliability is given
by,
Rs = RE ⋅ R (b) + (1 − RE ) ⋅ R(c)

Where R (b) and R(c) are reliabilities of system in Figure 5-13 b and figure 5-13 c.
R(b) = [1 − (1 − RA) ⋅ (1 − RB)][1 − (1 − RC )(1 − RD)]
R(c) = [1 − (1 − RA ⋅ RB)(1 − RC ⋅ RD)]
R(b) =0.98725
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R(c) =0.978975
And Rs=(0.8)(0.9875)+(0.2)(0.978975) = 0.9858
The result of the software run is shown in Figure 5-14. The tiesest and cutset for the network
are listed below:
Tieset: T1 {A,C), T2{B,D},T3{A,E,D},T4{B,E,D}
Cutset: C1 {A,B},C2{C,D},C3{A,E,D},C4{B,E,C}

Figure 5-14: System Reliability for Example2 Using the Developed Software.
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A System from Nelson, Batts &Beadles.[3]
Figure 5-15 shows a complex system. It has 16 components and arranged in series a parallel
combination. Because of large number of components, computation of reliability requires
use of some kind of software tool and thus this system was an apt example to verify the
software developed under this research. System has 55 tiesets and 10 cutsets. All of the
tieset and the cutset along with the individual probability of success of component are listed
below:
1

2

3

4

7

5

6

8

11

9

12

10

13

14

15
16

Figure 5 –15: A Complex System
Cutsets:
C1{1,2,3},C2{1,2,6},C3{3,4,5},C4{4,5,6},C5{9,10,14},C6{7,8,10,14},C7{9,10,15,16},
C8{11,12,13,14},C9{7,8,10,15,16},C10{11,12,13,15,16}.
Probability of Success:
Pr{1}=0.80, Pr{1}=0.80, Pr{2}=0.80, Pr{3}=0.90, Pr{4}=0.85, Pr{5}=0.75, Pr{6}=0.82,
Pr{7}=0.82,

Pr{8}=0.89,

Pr{9}=0.88,

Pr{10}=0.85,

Pr{11}=0.85,

Pr{12}=0.85,

Pr{13}=0.80, Pr{14}=0.75, Pr{15}=0.70, Pr{16}=0.70.
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Tiesets:

Table 5.1 Number of Tiesets for the System in 5-15
S.Nos

Tieset

S.Nos

Tieset

S.Nos

Tieset

S.Nos

Tieset

T1

{1,4,7,9,11}

T15

{1,5,8,9,11}

T29

{1,4,10,11}

T43

{1,5,14,15},

T2

{1,4,7,9,12}

T16

{1,5,8,9,12}

T30

{1,4,10,12}

T44

{1,5,14,16},

T3

{1,4,7,9,13}

T17

{1,5,8,9,13}

T31

{1,4,10,13}

T45

{3,6,7,9,11}

T4

{1,4,8,9,11}

T18

{1,5,10,11}

T32

{1,4,14,15}

T46

{3,6,7,9,12}

T5

{1,4,8,9,12}

T19

{1,5,10,12}

T33

{1,4,14,16}

T47

{3,6,7,9,13}

T6

{1,4,8,9,13}

T20

{1,5,10,13}

T34

{1,5,7,9,11}

T48

{3,6,8,9,11}

T7

{1,4,10,11}

T21

{1,5,14,15}

T35

{1,5,7,9,12}

T49

{3,6,8,9,12}

T8

{1,4,10,12}

T22

{1,5,14,16}

T36

{1,5,7,9,13}

T50

{3,6,8,9,13}

T9

{1,4,10,13}

T23

{1,4,7,9,11}

T37

{1,5,8,9,11}

T51

{3,6,10,11}

T10

{1,4,14,15}

T24

{1,4,7,9,12}

T38

{1,5,8,9,12}

T52

{3,6,10,12}

T11

{1,4,14,16}

T25

{1,4,7,9,13}

T39

{1,5,8,9,13}

T53

{3,6,10,13}

T12

{1,5,7,9,11}

T26

{1,4,8,9,11}

T40

{1,5,10,11}

T54

{3,6,14,15}

T13

{1,5,7,9,12}

T27

{1,4,8,9,12}

T41

{1,5,10,12}

T55

{3,6,14,16}

T14

{1,5,7,9,13}

T28

{1,4,8,9,13}

T42

{1,5,10,13}

System reliability was found out to be 0.97226, which is same as that stated in the paper, by
Nelson, Batts & Beadles. Figure 5-16 shows the results obtained by running the software.
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Figure 5-16: System Reliability for Example-3 Using the Developed Software.
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&KDSWHU
&RQFOXVLRQVDQG)XWXUH:RUN
6.1

Conclusions:
The aim of this research was to develop a software tool to estimate hardware,

software and system reliability. The author did not come across any literature where such an
integrated tool was presented or described. The software was implemented in Visual Basic. It
provides a user-friendly environment, where small set of easily comprehend input factors are
required. Data entry, data update and data retrieval can be performed in a short period of
time.
In most of the reliability estimation several things are needed to find out the exact
reliability of products. They are listed as follows:
(a) Collecting failure and test time data.
(b) Calculating estimates of model parameters using the data.
(c) Testing the fit of a model against the collected data.
(d) Applying the model for future predictions.
It is the commonality of these and other features, which leads to the development of special
purpose reliability measurement tools. The model implemented under hardware reliability
were:
I.

Exponential.

II.

Normal.

III.

Log-Normal.

IV.

Weibull.
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The models for estimating software reliability were:
I.

Exponential.

II.

Weibull.

III.

Gamma.

IV.

Power.

V.

Logarithmic.

VI.

Inverse Linear.
Apart from the above models several goodness of fit tests were incorporated in the

software to aid user in deciding which is the best model for that particular data set. The
software tool was applied to various data and the results like model parameters, reliability
and failure intensity values, statistical test values and tiesets and cutsets probabilities were
verified with hand calculations and from published literature.
6.2

Future Work.
The software developed was able to perform calculations for hardware reliability,

software reliability and system reliability. However as the respective areas of application
being very vast, the software has following limitations.
1. For hardware reliability the software assumes complete data. For other kinds of data
set like singly censored data, multiple censored data etc., reliability cannot be
estimated.
2. For system reliability the software reliability does not calculate tieset and cutset for
given block diagram of system.
3. For system reliability the matrix size is limited to 100 by 100 thereby allowing
software to estimate reliabilities of system having upto 100 tiesets or cutsets.
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The capability of this software can be improved by interfacing it with other software
and databases. The software can be extended in a number of areas, some of which are as
follows:

• Reliability estimation by using other distributions and models.
• Provision for additional statistical analysis for the data.
• An algorithm which determines tiesets and cutsets for the system.
• Models for of maintainability and availability of the products/systems.

90

Appendix A: Bartlett’s Test for Exponential Distribution.
A specific test for fitting exponential distribution is Bartlett’s test. The hypotheses are
H0: Failure times are exponential
H1: Failure times are not exponential.
The test statistic is
n
 

 n 
2 ⋅ n ⋅  ln (1 / n )⋅  ∑ t i   − (1 / n )⋅ ∑ ln(t i ) 

 


i =1
 i =1  



B=
1 + (n + 1) / (6 ⋅ n )

Where ti = time of failure of ith unit.
n = number of failures
The Test statistic B under the null hypothesis has a chi-square distribution with n-1 degrees
of freedom. In this test if,
χ2 (1-α/2,n-1) < B < χ2 (α/2,n-1)
then null hypothesis is accepted; otherwise the alternative hypothesis is accepted.
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Appendix B: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
A goodness of fit test for Normal and Log normal distribution is KolgomorovSmirnov test. The hypotheses for the test is ;
H0: The failure times are normal (lognormal)
H1: the failure times are not normal (lognormal)
The test statistic is
Dn = max{D1 , D2 }

where

  t − t  i −1
i
 t − t 
 and D2 =  − φ  i
D1 =  φ  i
−
 
n 
 s 
  s 
n
n

n

ti
and s 2 =
i =1 n

t =∑

∑ (ti − t )2
i =1

n −1

If Dn < Dcrit , then accept H0 otherwise accept H1. The values of Dcrit may be found in the
standard Kolgomorov-Smirnov table.
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Appendix C: Mann’s Test for Weibull Distribution.
A specific test for weibull failure distribution is a test developed by Mann, Schafer, and
Singapurwalla. The hypotheses are,
H0: The failure times of weibull.
H1: The failure times are not weibull.
The test statistic is:
k1 ⋅
M =

n −1

∑ (ln(ti +1 ) − ln(ti ))/ M i

i = k 1+ 1
k1

k 2 ⋅ ∑ (ln(t i +1 ) − ln(t i ) ) / M i
i =1

where k1 = | n/2 | , k2 | (n-1)/2|,
Mi =Zi+1 –Zi

i − 0.5 

Zi = ln − ln1 −

 n + 0.25 

And |x| is the integer portion for number x. Mi is an approximation. If M > then Fcrit, then H1
is accepted. Values for Fcrit, may be obtained from tables of the F-distribution if one lets the
number of degrees of freedom for numerator to be 2k2 and the number of degrees of freedom
for the denominator be 2k1.
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Appendix D: Newton Raphson Method for Finding Roots
As a numerical root finding procedure for systems of nonlinear simultaneous equations the
Newton-Raphson procedure can be used. This is a widely used technique for solving
equations where a direct algebraic solution in not possible. If a root for the equation f(x)=0 is
sought, the formula
f(xn)
xn+1 = xn − f´(x ), n=0, 1, …
n

(C.1)

can be used to improve the first approximation x0 to root to whatever degree of accuracy that
is required.
More generally, we want to solve multiple equations for roots βk (k=0, 1… w), i.e.,
we have the equation U(β)=0, where U(β) is a (w+1)×1 column vector with elements
Uk(β)=fk(β), k=0, 1, …, w. Then we have the formula

β´ = β − H−1(β) × U(β)

(C.2)

where β´ is closer to root than the previous approximation β. The matrix H(β), also called the
Hessian matrix, is a (w+1)×(w+1) square matrix with elements
Hkl(β) =

∂fk(β)
= fkl(β), k, l=0, 1, …, w.
∂βl

(C.3)

The above “matrix” version of the original Newton-Raphson formula is applied repeatedly by
replacing β with the newly found vector β´, until successive estimates agree to a specified
tolerance on an element by element basis.
If w=0, then β is a single-element vector and we obtain the original formula with xn
∂f0(β0)
replaced by β0, xn+1 by β0´, f(xn) by f0(β0), and f´(xn) by f00(β0)=
.
∂β0
If w=1, then we have
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f11 −f01 f0
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^β  β  f
f
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f

f

(C.4)

where fkl(β) is shown as fkl for simplicity.
In most cases w does not exceed 1 and in some cases it is 0, so we need not bother
ourselves with more complex situations.
In reliability estimation we have a function to be maximized. For example, in
maximum likelihood estimation we have the likelihood function L(β). To maximize it, its
derivatives are set to zero, i.e.,
∂lnL(β)
= 0, k=0, 1, …, w.
∂βk

(C.5)

So the elements of vector U(β) are
Uk(β) = fk(β) =

∂lnL(β)
= 0, k=0, 1, …, w, (C.6)
∂βk

and of matrix H(β) are
Hkl(β) = fkl(β) =

∂2lnL(β)
, k, l=0, 1, …, w. (C.7)
∂βk ∂βl

The Newton-Raphson procedure converges rapidly if it does, which generally
happens if the initial estimate is close enough to ^β. If the initial estimate is poor it may
diverge. Also, the evaluation of the Hessian matrix, and its inversion, may pose formidable
computational problems.
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Appendix E:U-plot
The purpose of U-plot is to determine weather predictions from the distribution are close to
the true distributions. It can be shown that if random variable Tj truly had the distribution
Fˆ j (t ) the random variable Uj = Fˆ j (t ) will be uniformly distributed on (0,1). Any departure
from such uniformity will indicate some kind of deviation between Fˆ j (t ) and truth F j (t )
One way of looking for departure is by plotting the sample distribution function of the uj
sequence. This is a step function constructed as follows: for a sequence of predictions,
F j (t ) ,j = s,…i on the interval (0,1), place the points us us+1…ui; then from left to right plot an
increasing step function, with each step of height 1/(i-s+2) at each u on the abscissa. The
range of the resulting monotonically increasing function is (0,1) and is known as U-plot.
1

0

U-Plot

1
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Appendix F: Code of the Software Developed
Editor Form
Option Explicit
Private FileName As String ' The full file name.
Private FileTitle As String ' The file name without path.
Private DataModified As Boolean
' Return True if the data is safe.
Private Function DataSafe() As Boolean
' No problem if the data is unmodified.
If Not DataModified Then
DataSafe = True
Exit Function
End If
' See if the user wants to save changes.
Select Case MsgBox ("The data has been modified. Do you want to save the
changes?"vbYesNoCancel)
Case vbYes
' Save the data. Procedure SaveData will reset DataModified.
mnuesaveas_Click
DataSafe = Not DataModified
Case vbNo
' Discard the changes to the data.
DataSafe = True
Case vbNo
' Cancel.
DataSafe = False
End Select
End Function
' Load data from the file. @@@ Modify to load data of the correct format.
Private Sub LoadData(ftitle As String, fname As String)
Dim fnum As Integer
' Open the file.
fnum = FreeFile
Open fname For Input As fnum
' Read all the bytes in the file into the TextBox.
EditorText.Text = Input(LOF(fnum), fnum)
' Close the file.
Close fnum
' Save the file name and title.
FileTitle = ftitle
FileName = fname
' Make sure the caption gets updated.
DataModified = True
SetDataChanged False
End Sub
' Save data into the file.
' @@@ Modify to save data in the correct format.
Private Sub SaveData(ftitle As String, fname As String)
Dim fnum As Integer
' Open the file.
fnum = FreeFile
Open fname For Output As fnum
' Write text from the TextBox into the file.
Print #fnum, EditorText.Text
' Close the file.
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Close fnum
' Save the file name and title.
FileTitle = ftitle
FileName = fname
' Make sure the caption gets updated.
DataModified = True
SetDataChanged False
End Sub
' Set DataModified. Display an asterisk in the
' form's Caption next to the file name if
' appropriate.
Private Sub SetDataChanged(changed As Boolean)
' Don't bother if it's already been done.
If DataModified = changed Then Exit Sub
DataModified = changed
If changed Then
Caption = "Editor*[" & FileTitle & "]"
Else
Caption = "Editor [" & FileTitle & "]"
End If
End Sub
' Set the file dialog's path for the next time.
Private Sub SetDialogPath()
Dim file_path As String
' Remove characters from the right until the
' path ends in \.
file_path = filedialog.FileName
Do While Right$(file_path, 1) <> "\"
file_path = Left$(file_path, Len(file_path) - 1)
Loop
filedialog.InitDir = file_path
' Save the directory in the registry. @@@ Change the application and section names.
SaveSetting "SimpleEditor", "Directories", _
"SaveDir", filedialog.InitDir
End Sub
' Mark the data as modified. @@@ Call DataChanged whenever the user @@@ changes the
data.
Private Sub EditorText_Change()
SetDataChanged True
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Load()
Dim wid As Single
Dim hgt As Single
' Get the last directory the program accessed.
' If there is no entry, use the App.Path.
' @@@ Change the application and section names.
filedialog.InitDir = GetSetting( _
"SimpleEditor", "Directories", _
"SaveDir", App.path)
End Sub
' Make sure the data is safe to unload.
Private Sub Form_QueryUnload(Cancel As Integer, UnloadMode As Integer)
Cancel = Not DataSafe
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Resize()
EditorText.Move 0, 0, ScaleWidth, ScaleHeight
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End Sub
' Unload the form.
Private Sub mnueexit_Click()
' Note: The QueryUnload event handler checks
' that the data is safe.
Unload Me
End Sub
' Start a new file.
Private Sub mnuenew_Click()
' Make sure the existing data is safe.
If Not DataSafe Then Exit Sub
' @@@ Do whatever is necessary to start a
' @@@ new document.
EditorText.Text = ""
' Save the file name and title.
FileTitle = ""
FileName = ""
' Make sure the caption gets updated.
DataModified = True
SetDataChanged False
End Sub
' Open a file.
Private Sub mnueopen_Click()
' Make sure the existing data is safe.
If Not DataSafe Then Exit Sub
' Start in the application directory.
If filedialog.InitDir = "" Then _
filedialog.InitDir = App.path
' @@@ Set desired flags.
filedialog.Flags = cdlOFNFileMustExist + _
cdlOFNHideReadOnly + _
cdlOFNLongNames
' @@@ Set desired filters.
filedialog.Filter = "hardware (*.hrd)|*.hrd |"
filedialog.Filter = filedialog.Filter + "software (*.sft)|*.sft |"
filedialog.FilterIndex = 0
' Let the user select the file to open.
On Error Resume Next
filedialog.ShowOpen
If Err.Number = cdlCancel Then
' The user canceled.
Exit Sub
ElseIf Err.Number <> 0 Then
MsgBox "Error" & Str$(Err.Number) & " selecting file." & _
vbCrLf & Err.Description
Exit Sub
End If
On Error GoTo 0
' Set the dialog path for next time.
SetDialogPath
' Load the data.
LoadData filedialog.FileTitle, filedialog.FileName
End Sub
' Save using the current file name.
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Private Sub mnuesave_Click()
' If there's no file name, treat as Save As.
If FileTitle = "" Then
mnuesaveas_Click
Exit Sub
End If
' Save the data using the current file name.
SaveData FileTitle, FileName
End Sub
' Save using a new file name.
Private Sub mnuesaveas_Click()
' Start in the application directory.
If filedialog.InitDir = "" Then _
filedialog.InitDir = App.path
' @@@ Set desired flags.
filedialog.Flags = cdlOFNPathMustExist + _
cdlOFNHideReadOnly + _
cdlOFNLongNames
' @@@ Set desired filters.
filedialog.Filter = "hardware (*.hrd)|*.hrd | "
filedialog.Filter = filedialog.Filter + "software (*.sft)|*.sft |"
filedialog.FilterIndex = 1
' Let the user select the file to open.
On Error Resume Next
filedialog.ShowSave
If Err.Number = cdlCancel Then
' The user canceled.
Exit Sub
ElseIf Err.Number <> 0 Then
MsgBox "Error" & Str$(Err.Number) & " selecting file." & _
vbCrLf & Err.Description
Exit Sub
End If
On Error GoTo 0
' Set the dialog path for next time.
SetDialogPath
' Load the data.
SaveData filedialog.FileTitle, filedialog.FileName
End Sub

Reliability Calculator Form
Option Explicit
Private Sub cmdclear_Click()
txtmissiontime.Text = ""
txtreliability.Text = ""
End Sub
Private Sub cmdexponential_Click()
Dim frate As Single
mtime = txtmissiontime.Text
frate = Val(txtfailurerate.Text)
If txtmissiontime.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " Enter the Mission Time"
Exit Sub
End If
If txtfailurerate.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "Enter the parameters for Exponential distribution", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
hrel = (Exp(-frate * mtime))
txtreliability.Text = hrel
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End Sub
Private Sub cmdgamma_Click()
mtime = txtmissiontime.Text
If txtmissiontime.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " Enter the Mission Time"
Else
End If
Exit Sub
txtreliability.Text = hrel
End Sub
Private Sub cmdlognormal_Click()
Dim pi As Single
Dim X As Double, z As Double
Dim h As Single
Dim sum As Double
Dim lnshape As Double, lnloc As Double
mtime = txtmissiontime.Text
lnshape = Val(txtshapeparameter.Text)
lnloc = Val(txtlocation.Text)
If txtmissiontime.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " Enter the Mission Time"
Exit Sub
End If
If txtshapeparameter.Text = "" Or txtlocation.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "Enter the parameters for Log Normal distribution", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
pi = 3.14
X = -20
z = (1 / lnshape) * Log(mtime / lnloc)
h = 0.005
sum = 0
Do While X < z
sum = sum + ((1 / (Sqr(2 * pi))) * (Exp((-X ^ 2 / 2)))) * h
X = X + h
Loop
hrel = 1 - sum
txtreliability.Text = hrel
End Sub
Private Sub cmdnormal_Click()
Dim pi As Single
Dim X As Double, z As Double
Dim h As Single
Dim sum As Double
Dim nmean As Double, nstddev As Double
mtime = txtmissiontime.Text
nmean = Val(txtnormalmean.Text)
nstddev = Val(txtstandarddev.Text)
If txtmissiontime.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " Enter the Mission Time"
Else
Exit Sub
End If
If txtnormalmean.Text = "" Or txtstandarddev.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "Enter the parameters for Normal distribution", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
pi = 3.14
X = -20
z = (mtime - nmean) / nstddev
h = 0.005
sum = 0
Do While X < z
sum = sum + (((1 / Sqr(2 * pi)) * Exp((-(X ^ 2) / 2))) * h)
X = X + h
Loop
hrel = 1 - sum
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txtreliability.Text = hrel
End Sub
Private Sub cmdweibull_Click()
Dim wscale As Single
Dim wshape As Single
mtime = txtmissiontime.Text
wshape = Val(txtwshape.Text)
wscale = Val(txtwscale.Text)
If txtmissiontime.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " Enter the Mission Time"
Exit Sub
End If
If txtwshape.Text = "" Or txtwscale.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "Enter the parameters for Weibull distribution", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
hrel = Exp(-(((mtime - wshape) / wscale) ^ wshape))
txtreliability.Text = hrel
End Sub

Menu Editor Form
Option Explicit
' Cd drive variable
Private Declare Function mciSendString Lib "winmm.dll" Alias "mciSendStringA"
(ByVal lpstrCommand As String, ByVal lpstrReturnString As String, ByVal
uReturnLength As Long, ByVal hwndCallback As Long) As Long
'editor variables
Private FileName As String ' The full file name.
Private FileTitle As String ' The file name without path.
Private DataModified As Boolean
Private Sub mnuarrangeicons_Click()
frmret.Arrange vbArrangeIcons
End Sub
Private Sub mnucascade_Click()
frmret.Arrange vbCascade
End Sub
Private Sub mnucdclose_Click()
mciSendString "Set CDAudio Door Closed Wait", _
End Sub
Private Sub mnucdopen_Click()
mciSendString "Set CDAudio Door Open Wait", _
End Sub
Private Sub mnuchi_Click()
frmchisquare.Show
End Sub
Private Sub mnuexit_Click()
Beep
End
End Sub
Private Sub mnufisher_Click()
frmfisher.Show
End Sub
Private Sub mnuForm1_Click()
frmhelp1.Show
End Sub
Private Sub mnuhardware_Click()
frmhardware1.Show
End Sub
Private Sub mnuks_Click()
frmks.Show
End Sub
Private Sub mnunewfile_Click()
editorform.Show
End Sub

Private Sub mnuphardware_Click()
On Error GoTo 1
frmhardware1.PrintForm
MsgBox "Done !", 64, vbExclamation
Exit Sub
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1
MsgBox "There was problem printing to yout printer", vbExclamation
End Sub
Private Sub mnupresults_Click()
On Error GoTo 3
frmresult.PrintForm
MsgBox "Done !", 64, vbExclamation
Exit Sub
3
MsgBox "There was problem printing to yout printer", vbExclamation
End Sub
Private Sub mnupsoftware_Click()
On Error GoTo 2
frmsoftware.PrintForm
MsgBox "Done !", 64, vbExclamation
Exit Sub
2
MsgBox "There was problem printing to yout printer", vbExclamation
End Sub
Private Sub mnurcal_Click()
frmhardware.Show
End Sub
Private Sub mnusoftware_Click()
frmsoftware.Show
End Sub
Private Sub mnusystem_Click()
frmsystem.Show
End Sub
Private Sub mnutile_Click()
frmret.Arrange vbTileVertical
End Sub
Hardware Reliability Form:
Option Explicit
Private Sub cmdchisquare_Click()
Dim p1 As Double
If txtalpha.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "Input the level of significance", vbCritical
Exit Sub
End If
p1 = Val(txtalpha.Text)
If IsNumeric(txtalpha.Text) Then
p1 = Val(txtalpha.Text)
If p1 < 0 Or p1 > 1 Then
MsgBox " invalid number"
Exit Sub
End If
Else
MsgBox "Invalid number"
Exit Sub
End If
If optexpdist = True Then
Dim cal_p As Double, p(2) As Double
Dim dof As Integer
Dim x(2) As Double
Dim k As Double, t As Double, a As Double
Dim v As Double, dv As Double
For i = 1 To 2
p(1) = p1 / 2
p(2) = 1 - p1 / 2
n = Val(txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text)
dof = n - 1
v = 0.5
dv = 0.5
x(i) = 0
Do While (dv > 0.000001)
x(i) = 1 / v - 1
dv = dv / 2
cal_p = Exp(-0.5 * x(i))
If dof Mod 2 > 0 Then
cal_p = cal_p * Sqr(2 * x(i) / 3.14)
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End If
k = dof
Do While (k > 2 Or k = 2)
cal_p = cal_p * (x(i) / k)
k = k - 2
Loop
t = cal_p
a = dof
Do While (t > 0.000001 * p(i))
a = a + 2
t = t * (x(i) / a)
cal_p = cal_p + t
Loop
If (1 - cal_p) > 1 - p(i) Then
v = v - dv
Else
v = v + dv
End If
Loop
Next i
If x(1) < barlett And barlett < x(2) Then
lbldes.Caption = "As calculated Bartlett's test statistic," + Str(Format(barlett,
"#.000")) + ", is falls between the crritical chi square values," +
Str(Format(x(1), "0.000")) + "and" + Str(Format(x(2), "0.000")) + ", hypothesis
that data belongs to exponential distribution is accepted"
Else
lbldes.Caption = "As calculated Bartlett's test statistic," +
Str(Format(barlett, "0.000")) + ", does not falls between the critical chi square
values," + Str(Format(x(1), "0.000")) + "and" + Str(Format(x(2), "0.000")) + ",
hypothesis that data belongs to exponential distribution is not accepted"
End If
End If
If optweibulldist = True Then
Dim n1 As Double, n2 As Double, k1 As Double, k2 As Double, f As Double
Dim ff As Double
n = Val(txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text)
k1 = Int(n / 2)
k2 = Int((n - 1) / 2)
p1 = Val(txtalpha.Text)
n1 = 2 * k1
n2 = 2 * k2
ff = afishf(p1, n1, n2)
If ff < mann Then
lbldes.Caption = "As critical F-value," + Str(Format(afishf(p1, n1, n2),
"0.000")) + ", is less than the calculated Mann's test statistic," +
Str(Format(mann, "#.000")) + ", hypothesis that data belongs to weibull
distribution is not accepted"
Else
lbldes.Caption = "As calculated Mann's test statistic," + Str(Format(mann,
"#.000")) + ", is less than the critical F-value," + Str(Format(afishf(p1, n1,
n2), "0.000")) + ", hypothesis that data belongs to weibull distribution is
accepted"
End If
End If
If optlognormaldist = True Or optnormaldist = True Then
Dim ks2 As Double
n = Val(txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text)
p1 = Val(txtalpha.Text)
if (p1 = 0.2 Or p1 = 0.15 Or p1 = 0.1 Or p1 = 0.05 Or p1 = 0.01) And (n >= 4 Or n
<= 20 Or n = 25 Or n = 30) Then
If p1 = 0.2 Then
If n >= 4 And n <= 20 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 1
frmks.grdks.Row = n - 3
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
Else
If n = 25 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 1
frmks.grdks.Row = 18
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
End If
If n = 30 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 1
frmks.grdks.Row = 18
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
End If
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If n > 30 Then
ks2 = 0.736 / Sqr(n)
End If
End If
End If
If p1 = 0.15 Then
If n >= 4 And n <= 20 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 2
frmks.grdks.Row = n - 3
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
Else
If n = 25 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 2
frmks.grdks.Row = 18
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
End If
If n = 30 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 2
frmks.grdks.Row = 18
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
End If
If n > 30 Then
ks2 = 0.768 / Sqr(n)
End If
End If
End If
If p1 = 0.1 Then
If n >= 4 And n <= 20 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 3
frmks.grdks.Row = n - 3
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
Else
If n = 25 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 3
frmks.grdks.Row = 18
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
End If
If n = 30 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 3
frmks.grdks.Row = 18
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
End If
If n > 30 Then
ks2 = 0.805 / Sqr(n)
End If
End If
End If
If p1 = 0.05 Then
If n >= 4 And n <= 20 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 4
frmks.grdks.Row = n - 3
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
Else
If n = 25 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 4
frmks.grdks.Row = 18
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
End If
If n = 30 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 4
frmks.grdks.Row = 18
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
End If
If n > 30 Then
ks2 = 0.886 / Sqr(n)
End If
End If
End If
If p1 = 0.01 Then
If n >= 4 And n <= 20 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 5
frmks.grdks.Row = n - 3
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
Else
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If n = 25 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 5
frmks.grdks.Row = 18
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
End If
If n = 30 Then
frmks.grdks.Col = 5
frmks.grdks.Row = 18
ks2 = Val(frmks.grdks.Text)
End If
If n > 30 Then
ks2 = 1.031 / Sqr(n)
End If
End If
End If
Else
MsgBox "Input alpha value from 0.2,0.15,0.10,0.05,0.01 or data not available for n
= 21,22,23,24,26,27,28,29"
Exit Sub
End If
If optlognormaldist = True Then
If k_s < ks2 Then
lbldes.Caption = "As calculated Komogorov -Smirnov value," +
Str(Format(k_s, "0.000")) + ", is less than the critical Kolmogorov-Smirnov value,"
+ Str(Format(ks2, "#.000")) + ", hypothesis that data belongs to LogNormal
distribution is accepted"
Else
lbldes.Caption = "As critical Komogorov -Smirnov value," + Str(Format(ks2,
"0.000")) + ", is less than the calculated Kolmogorov-Smirnov value," +
Str(Format(k_s, "#.000")) + ", hypothesis that data belongs to LogNormal
distribution is not accepted"
End If
End If
If optnormaldist = True Then
If k_s < ks2 Then
lbldes.Caption = "As calculated Komogorov -Smirnov value," +
Str(Format(k_s, "0.000")) + ", is less than the critical Kolmogorov-Smirnov value,"
+ Str(Format(ks2, "#.000")) + ", hypothesis that data belongs to Normal
distribution is accepted"
Else
lbldes.Caption = "As critical Komogorov -Smirnov value," + Str(Format(ks2,
"0.000")) + ", is less than the calculated Kolmogorov-Smirnov value ," +
Str(Format(k_s, "#.000")) + ", hypothesis that data belongs to Normal distribution
is not accepted"
End If
End If
End If
End Sub
Function fishf(f As Double, n1 As Double, n2 As Double)
Dim v As Double, dv As Double,
Dim x As Double
Dim th As Double, a As Double,
Double
Dim c As Double, pi As Double,
pi = 3.14159265358979
pid2 = pi / 2
k1 = Int(n / 2)
k2 = Int((n - 1) / 2)
n1 = 2 * k1
n2 = 2 * k2
x = n2 / (n1 * f + n2)
If n1 Mod 2 = 0 Then
fishf = statcom(1 - x, n2,
Exit Function
End If
If n2 Mod 2 = 0 Then
fishf = 1 - statcom(x,
Exit Function
End If
th = Atn(Sqr(n1 * f / n2))
a = th / pid2
sth = Sin(th)
cth = Cos(th)

k1 As Double, k2 As Double
sth As Double, cth As Double, b As Double, b1 As
pid2 As Double, k As Double

n1 + n2 - 4, n2 - 2) * (x ^ (n2 / 2))

n1, n1 + n2 - 4, n1 - 2) * ((1 - x) ^ (n1 / 2))
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If n2 > 1 Then
a = a + (sth * cth * (statcom(cth * cth, 2, n2 - 3, -1)) / pid2)
End If
If n1 = 1 Then
fishf = 1 - a
End If
c = 4 * statcom(sth * sth, n2 + 1, n1 + n2 - 4, n2 - 2) * sth * ((cth ^
n2) / pi)
If n2 = 1 Then
fishf = 1 - a + c / 2
End If
k = 2
Do While (k <= (n2 - 1) / 2)
c = c * k / (k - 0.5)
k = k + 1
Loop
fishf = 1 - a + c
End Function
Function statcom(q, i,
Dim zz As Double, z As
zz = 1
z = zz
k = i
Do While (k <= j)
zz = zz * q * k / (k z = z + zz
k = k + 2
Loop
statcom = z '( returns
End Function

j, b)
Double, k As Double

b)

z)

Function afishf(p1 As Double, n1 As Double, n2 As Double)
Dim v As Double, dv As Double, f As Double, k1 As Double, k2 As Double
p1 = Val(txtalpha.Text)
v = 0.5
dv = 0.5
f = 0
Do While (dv > 0.000001)
f = 1 / v - 1
dv = dv / 2
If (fishf(f, n1, n2)) > p1 Then
v = v - dv
Else
v = v + dv
End If
Loop
afishf = f '(returns f)
End Function
Private Sub cmdclear_Click()
Dim k As Integer
For k = 1 To 100
grddatah1.Col = 0
grddatah1.Row = k
grddatah1.Text = ""
Next k
For k = 1 To 100
grddatah1.Col = 1
grddatah1.Row = k
grddatah1.Text = ""
Next k
txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text = ""
txtsumtotalh1.Text = ""
txtfilename1.Text = ""
optlognormaldist.Value = False
optnormaldist.Value = False
optexpdist.Value = False
optweibulldist.Value = False
txtmtimeh1.Text = ""
txthrel1.Text = ""
txtalpha.Text = ""
lbldes.Caption = ""
Text1.Visible = False
Text2.Visible = False
Text3.Visible = False
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Text4.Visible = False
Text5.Visible = False
txtalpha.Visible = False
lbldes.Visible = False
cmdchisquare.Visible = False
End Sub
Private Sub cmdhrel1_Click()
'=================================================
'ERROR CHECK
If txtfilename1.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " Select a failure data file!", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
grddatah1.Col = 1
grddatah1.Row = 1
If grddatah1.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " Open the selected file", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
If txtmtimeh1.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " Enter the mission time ", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
If IsNumeric(txtmtimeh1.Text) Then
mtime = Val(txtmtimeh1.Text)
If mtime <= 0 Then
MsgBox "Invalid input", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
Else
MsgBox "Invalid Input", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
If optexpdist.Value = False And optnormaldist.Value = False And
optlognormaldist.Value = False And optweibulldist.Value = False Then
MsgBox " Select a Distribution", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
'EXPONENTIAL DISTRIBUTION
'*************************
If optexpdist.Value = True Then
Dim lambda As Double, sumb1 As Double, sumb2 As Double
lambda = Val(txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text) / Val(txtsumtotalh1.Text)
mttf = 1 / lambda
hrel = (Exp(-lambda * mtime))
If hrel < 0 Then
txthrel1.Text = 0
Else
If hrel > 1 Then
txthrel1.Text = 1
Else
txthrel1.Text = hrel
End If
End If
n = Val(txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text)
sumb1 = 0
sumb2 = 0
For i = 1 To n
grddatah1.Col = 1
grddatah1.Row = i
sumb1 = sumb1 + grddatah1.Text
sumb2 = sumb2 + Log(grddatah1.Text)
Next i
barlett = 2 * n * ((Log((1 / n) * (sumb1))) - ((1 / n) * (sumb2))) / (1 + ((n + 1)
/ (n * 6)))
Text1.Text = "Distribution selected: Exponential"
Text2.Text = "Mean Time to Failure:" + Str(Format(mttf, "0.000"))
Text3.Text = "Lambda:" + Str(Format(lambda, "#.000000"))
Text4.Text = " Bartletts Test Statistic:" + Str(Format(barlett, "#.000"))
Text5.Text = " Bartletts test value is then compared with the Chisquared value
(also known as critical value) with degrees of freedom" + Str(n - 1) + " and level
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of significance alhpa (user decides this value) from the standard table. If the
Bartlett's test value is less than the critical value than the data is good fit for
exponential distribution"
cmdchisquare.Caption = "Chi- square"
End If
'NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
'*******************
If optnormaldist.Value = True Then
Dim mean As Single, evariance As Single, svariance As Single, tbar As Single
Dim evar As Single, hfailure(200) As Single
Dim x As Single, z As Double, kssum(200) As Single, l1 As Integer, index1 As
Integer
Dim h As Single, D1(200) As Single, D2(200) As Single, min1 As Single
Dim nstddev As Double, newd1(200) As Single, newd2(200) As Single
n = Val(txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text)
mean = Val(txtsumtotalh1.Text) / n
mttf = Val(txtsumtotalh1.Text) / n
tbar = 0
evar = 0
For i = 1 To n
grddatah1.Col = 1
grddatah1.Row = i
evar = evar + ((grddatah1.Text) ^ 2)
tbar = tbar + grddatah1.Text / n
Next i
evariance = 0
For j = 1 To n
evariance = evariance + ((grddatah1.Text - tbar) ^ 2)
Next j
svariance = Sqr(evariance / n - 1)
nstddev = Sqr(((n * evar) - ((sum) ^ 2)) / ((n) * (n - 1)))
pi = 3.14
x = -10
mtime = Val(txtmtimeh1.Text)
z = (mtime - mean) / nstddev
h = 0.005
sumh = 0
Do While x < z
sumh = sumh + (((1 / Sqr(2 * pi)) * Exp((-(x ^ 2) / 2))) * h)
x = x + h
Loop
hrel = 1 - sumh
If hrel < 0 Then
txthrel1.Text = 0
Else
txthrel1.Text = hrel
End If
min1 = 100000
' sorts the failure data
For m = 1 To n
For l1 = 1 To n
If failure(l1) < min1 Then
min1 = failure(l1)
index1 = l1
End If
Next l1
hfailure(m) = min1
failure(index1) = 100000
min1 = 100000
Next m
For i = 1 To n
x = -4
z = (hfailure(i) - tbar) / (nstddev)
h = 0.005
kssum(i) = 0
Do While x < z
kssum(i) = kssum(i) + (((1 / Sqr(2 * pi)) * Exp((-(x ^ 2) / 2))) * h)
x = x + h
Loop
D1(i) = ((kssum(i)) - ((i - 1) / n))
D2(i) = ((i / n) - (kssum(i)))
Next i
min1 = 100000
' sorts the failure data
For m = 1 To n
For l1 = 1 To n
If D1(l1) < min1 Then
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min1 = D1(l1)
index1 = l1
End If
Next l1
newd1(m) = min1
D1(index1) = 100000
min1 = 100000
Next m
min1 = 100000
' sorts the failure data
For m = 1 To n
For l1 = 1 To n
If D2(l1) < min1 Then
min1 = D2(l1)
index1 = l1
End If
Next l1
newd2(m) = min1
D2(index1) = 100000
min1 = 100000
Next m
If newd1(n) < newd2(n) Then
k_s = newd2(n)
Else
k_s = newd1(n)
End If
Text1.Text = " Distribution selected: Normal"
Text2.Text = " Mean:" + Str(Format(mean, "0.000"))
Text3.Text = " Standarad Deviation:" + Str(Format(nstddev, "#.000000"))
Text4.Text = " Kolgomorov-Smirnov Test Stat:" + Str(Format(k_s, "#.0000"))
Text5.Text = " Kolgomorov-Smirnov Test Stat test value is then compared with the
Kolgomorov -Smirnov test value from the standard table(also known as critical
value); with level of significance alpha (0.20, 0.15, 0.10 or 0.05). If the
calculated Kolgomorov-Smirnov Test Stat value is less than the critical value then
the data is good fit for Normal distribution"
cmdchisquare.Caption = "KS - Value"
End If
'LOG NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
'***********************
If optlognormaldist.Value = True Then
Dim lnmean As Single, lnloc As Single, lnsum As Single
Dim lnshape As Single, newsum As Single
Dim q As Integer
Dim lnvar As Double
n = Val(txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text)
lnsum = 0
For i = 1 To n
grddatah1.Col = 1
grddatah1.Row = i
lnsum = lnsum + Log(grddatah1.Text)
Next i
lnmean = lnsum / n
lnloc = Exp(lnmean)
newsum = 0
For q = 1 To n
grddatah1.Col = 1
grddatah1.Row = q
newsum = newsum + ((Log(grddatah1.Text) - lnmean) ^ 2)
Next q
lnshape = Sqr(newsum / n)
pi = 3.14
x = -20
z = (1 / lnshape) * Log(mtime / lnloc)
h = 0.005
sumh = 0
Do While x < z
sumh = sumh + ((1 / (Sqr(2 * pi))) * (Exp((-x ^ 2 / 2)))) * h
x = x + h
Loop
hrel = 1 - sumh
lnvar = (lnloc ^ 2) * (Exp(lnshape ^ 2)) * ((Exp(lnshape ^ 2)) - 1)
If hrel < 0 Then
txthrel1.Text = 0
Else
txthrel1.Text = hrel
End If
min1 = 100000
' sorts the failure data
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For m = 1 To n
For l1 = 1 To n
If failure(l1) < min1 Then
min1 = failure(l1)
index1 = l1
End If
Next l1
hfailure(m) = min1
failure(index1) = 100000
min1 = 100000
Next m
For i = 1 To n
x = -4
z = (1 / lnshape) * Log(hfailure(i) / lnloc)
h = 0.005
kssum(i) = 0
Do While x < z
kssum(i) = kssum(i) + (((1 / Sqr(2 * pi)) * Exp((-(x ^ 2) / 2))) * h)
x = x + h
Loop
D1(i) = (kssum(i) - ((i - 1) / n))
D2(i) = ((i / n) - (kssum(i)))
Next i
min1 = 100000
' sorts the failure data
For m = 1 To n
For l1 = 1 To n
If D1(l1) < min1 Then
min1 = D1(l1)
index1 = l1
End If
Next l1
newd1(m) = min1
D1(index1) = 100000
min1 = 100000
Next m
min1 = 100000
' sorts the failure data
For m = 1 To n
For l1 = 1 To n
If D2(l1) < min1 Then
min1 = D2(l1)
index1 = l1
End If
Next l1
newd2(m) = min1
D2(index1) = 100000
min1 = 100000
Next m
If newd1(n) < newd2(n) Then
k_s = newd2(n)
Else
k_s = newd1(n)
End If
Text1.Text = " Distribution selected: LogNormal"
Text2.Text = " Shape Parameter:" + Str(Format(lnshape, "0.000"))
Text3.Text = " Location Parameter:" + Str(Format(lnloc, "#.000000"))
Text4.Text = " Kolgomorov-Smirnov Test Stat:" + Str(Format(k_s, "#.0000"))
Text5.Text = " Kolgomorov-Smirnov Test Stat test value is then compared with the
Kolgomorov -Smirnov test value from the standard table(also known as critical
value); with level of significance alpha (0.20, 0.15, 0.10 or 0.05). If the
calculated Kolgomorov-Smirnov Test Stat value is less than the critical value then
the data is good fit for Log-Normal distribution"
cmdchisquare.Caption = "KS- Value"
End If
'WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION
'-------------------If optweibulldist.Value = True Then
Dim
Dim
Dim
Dim
Dim
Dim
Dim
Dim

l As Integer, p As Integer, r As Integer, t As Integer
a(200) As Single, sdata(200) As Single, index As Integer
min2 As Single, data(200) As Single, xj(200) As Double
xbar As Double, yj(200) As Double, ybar As Double, sumxj As Double
sumyj As Single, fj(200) As Single, b As Double, c As Double
b1 As Double, B2 As Double, wscale As Double, D As Double
k1 As Double, k2 As Double, den1 As Double
m1(100) As Double, z1(100) As Double, i1 As Double, num1 As Double
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Dim i2 As Integer, i3 As Integer, num As Double, den As Double, wshape As Double
n = Val(txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text)
For p = 1 To n
grddatah1.Col = 1
grddatah1.Row = p
data(p) = grddatah1.Text
Next p
min2 = 10000000
For m = 1 To n
For l = 1 To n
If data(l) < min2 Then
min2 = data(l)
index = l
End If
Next l
sdata(m) = min2
data(index) = 1000000
min2 = 10000000
Next m
sumxj = 0
sumyj = 0
For r = 1 To n
xj(r) = Log(sdata(r))
sumxj = sumxj + xj(r)
fj(r) = (r - 0.3) / (n + 0.4)
yj(r) = (Log(Log(1 / (1 - fj(r)))))
sumyj = sumyj + yj(r)
Next r
xbar = sumxj / n
ybar = sumyj / n
b1 = 0
B2 = 0
For t = 1 To n
b1 = b1 + ((xj(t) - (xbar)) * (yj(t) - (ybar)))
B2 = B2 + ((xj(t) - (xbar)) ^ 2)
Next t
b = b1 / B2
c = (ybar) - (b * xbar)
wshape = b
wscale = Exp(-c / b)
hrel = Exp(-((mtime / wscale) ^ b))
If hrel < 0 Then
txthrel1.Text = 0
Else
End If
If hrel > 1 Then
txthrel1.Text = 1
Else
txthrel1.Text = hrel
End If
For i = 1 To n
z1(i) = (Log(-Log(1 - ((i - 0.5) / (n + 0.25)))))
Next i
For i1 = 1 To n
m1(i1) = z1(i1 + 1) - z1(i1)
Next i1
k1 = Int(n / 2)
k2 = Int((n - 1) / 2)
num = 0
For i2 = k1 To n - 1
num = num + (((Log(sdata(i2 + 1))) - (Log(sdata(i2)))) / (m1(i2)))
Next i2
den = 0
For i3 = 1 To k1
den = den + (((Log(sdata(i3 + 1))) - (Log(sdata(i3)))) / (m1(i3)))
Next i3
num1 = num * k1
den1 = den * k2
mann = num1 / den1
Text1.Text = " Distribution selected: Weibull"
Text2.Text = " Shape Parameter:" + Str(Format(wshape, "0.000"))
Text3.Text = " Scale Parameter:" + Str(Format(wscale, "0.000000"))
Text4.Text = " Mann's Test Statistic:" + Str(Format(mann, "0.000"))
Text5.Text = " Manns test value is then compared with the F-distribution value(also
known as critical value)from the standard table F-distribution table; with degrees
of freedom" + Str(2 * k1) + " and " + Str(2 * k2) + ";and level of significance
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alpha (user decides this value). If the calculated Mann's test statistic is less
than the critical value than the data is good fit for Weibull distribution"
cmdchisquare.Caption = "F - Value"
End If
Text1.Visible = True
Text2.Visible = True
Text3.Visible = True
Text4.Visible = True
Text5.Visible = True
cmdchisquare.Visible = True
txtalpha.Visible = True
lblalpha.Visible = True
End Sub
Private Sub cmdopenfileh1_Click()
Dim sumh As Single
If txtfilename1.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "You must Select a Data File!"
Exit Sub
End If
pathname = dirdirectoryh1.path
If Right(dirdirectoryh1.path, 1) <> "\" Then
path = dirdirectoryh1 + "\"
Inp1 = path + txtfilename1.Text
Else
Inp1 = pathname + txtfilename1.Text
End If
Open Inp1 For Input As #2
i = 0
Do While Not EOF(2)
i = i + 1
Input #2, failure(i)
grddatah1.Col = 0
grddatah1.Row = i
grddatah1.Text = i
grddatah1.Col = 1
grddatah1.Row = i
grddatah1.Text = Val(failure(i))
Loop
txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text = i
Close #2
sum = 0
For j = 1 To Val(txtnumberoffailuresh1.Text)
grddatah1.Col = 1
grddatah1.Row = j
sum = sum + grddatah1.Text
Next j
txtsumtotalh1.Text = sum
End Sub
Private Sub dirdirectoryh1_Change()
'Here we change the files according to the directory
filfilesh1.path = dirdirectoryh1.path
End Sub
Private Sub drvdriveh1_Change()
'The next statement checks the error in the path
On Error GoTo driveerror
'change the path of the new drive
dirdirectoryh1.path = drvdriveh1.Drive
Exit Sub
driveerror:
' Here we restore the original drive
MsgBox "Device is not ready!", vbCritical, "Error"
drvdriveh1.Drive = dirdirectoryh1.path
End Sub
Private Sub filfilesh1_Click()
txtfilename1.Text = filfilesh1.FileName
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Load()
frmret.mnuphardware.Enabled = True
Text1.Visible = False
Text2.Visible = False
Text3.Visible = False
Text4.Visible = False
Text5.Visible = False
End Sub
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Software Reliability Form
'ADDITIONAL TIME CALCULATION
'****************************
Private Sub cmdadditional_Click()
Dim DFI As Double, deltat As Double
'ERROR CHECK
If txtDFI.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " Enter Desired failure Intensity ", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
DFI = Val(txtDFI.Text)
If IsNumeric(txtDFI.Text) Then
DFI = Val(txtDFI.Text)
If DFI < 0 Then
MsgBox "invalid number"
Exit Sub
End If
Else
MsgBox "Invalid Number"
Exit Sub
End If
If Val(txtDFI.Text) > Val(txtFI.Text) Then
MsgBox "Desired Failure Intensity should be less than current failure
intensity", vbCritical
Exit Sub
End If
'ERROR CHECK OVER
'EXPONENTIAL MODEL
'==================
If optexponential.Value = True Then
deltat = ((1 / b1new) * Log((TNF * b1new) / ((DFI) * (1 - Exp(-b1new *
TET))))) - TET
txtadditional.Text = deltat
End If
' GAMMA MODEL
'============
If optgamma.Value = True Then
deltat = ((Log((DFI) * (((Exp(b1new * TET)) - ((b1new * TET) + 1)) / (TNF *
b1new * b1new * TET * (Exp(b1new * TET)))))) * (-1 / b1new)) - TET
txtadditional.Text = deltat
End If
‘ POWER MODEL
'============
If optpower.Value = True Then
deltat = ((((DFI) * (TET ^ b1new)) / (TNF * b1new)) ^ (1 / (b1new - 1))) TET
txtadditional.Text = deltat
End If
' GEOMETRIC MODEL
'================
If optlp.Value = True Then
deltat = (TNF / (DFI * Log(1 + (b1new * TET)))) - (1 / b1new) - TET
txtadditional.Text = deltat
End If
' INVERSE LINEAR MODEL
'=====================
If optinverse.Value = True Then
deltat = ((((TNF) / ((((B1old + TET) ^ (1 / 2)) - ((B1old) ^ (1 / 2))) * 2
* DFI)) ^ 2) - (b1new)) - TET
txtadditional.Text = deltat
End If
'WEIBULL MODEL
'=====================
If optweibull.Value = True Then
MsgBox "Weibull has binomial data distribution and hence has estimated all
the failures", vbInformation
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End If
End Sub
Private Sub cmdcls_Click()
Dim k As Integer
For k = 1 To 200
grddata.Col = 0
grddata.Row = k
grddata.Text = ""
Next k
For k = 1 To 200
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = k
grddata.Text = ""
Next k
txtTET.Text = ""
txtTNF.Text = ""
txtfile.Text = ""
txtFI.Text = ""
txtDFI.Text = ""
txtadditional.Text = ""
txtsum = ""
optexponential.Value = False
optgamma.Value = False
optinverse.Value = False
optweibull.Value = False
optlp.Value = False
optpower.Value = False
MSChart2.Visible = False
Label3.Visible = False
End Sub
'FAILURE INTENSITY CALCULATION
'******************************
Private Sub cmdFI_Click()
Dim final As Double
If txtfile.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "You Must Select File !", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = 1
If grddata.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " Open the selected File", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
TET = Val(txtTET.Text)
If txtTET.Text = "" Then
MsgBox " You Must Enter End Of Test Time ", vbCritical
Exit Sub
End If
If IsNumeric(txtTET.Text) Then
TET = Val(txtTET.Text)
If TET <= 0 Then
MsgBox "invalid number"
Exit Sub
End If
Else
MsgBox "Invalid Number"
Exit Sub
End If
if optexponential.Value = False And optgamma.Value = False And
optinverse.Value = False And optlp.Value = False And optpower.Value = False
And optweibull.Value = False Then
MsgBox "You Must Select Model!", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
srtime = InputBox("Enter length of time interval for which relaibility has
to be calculated:", "RET-Input Box")
If srtime = "" Then
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MsgBox "Please enter the time interval", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
if Not IsNumeric(srtime) Then
MsgBox "Invalid Time !", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
TNF = Val(txtTNF.Text)
TET = Val(txtTET.Text)
If Val(txtTET) < failure(TNF) Then
MsgBox "Invalid Number - Test end time should be equal to or greater than
last failure time", vbExclamation
Exit Sub
End If
'EXPONENTIAL MODEL
'=================
If optexponential.Value = True Then
B1old = 0.0001
10 f = ((TNF / B1old) - ((TNF * TET) / ((Exp(B1old * TET)) - 1)) - (sum))
f1 = (-TNF / B1old ^ 2) - (TNF * (TET ^ 2) * (-1) * ((((Exp(B1old *
TET)) - 1)) ^ -2) * (Exp(B1old * TET)))
b1new = B1old - (f / f1)
If Abs(b1new - B1old) < 0.00000001 Then
b0 = TNF / (1 - (Exp(-b1new * TET)))
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = b1new * b0 * (Exp(-b1new * grddata.Text))
FD(l) = grddata.Text
grdresult1.Col = 2
grdresult1.Row = l
grdresult1.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.######")
FI(l) = fintensity
Next l
final = b1new * b0 * (Exp(-b1new * TET))
txtFI.Text = Format(final, "0.######")
Else
B1old = b1new
GoTo 10
End If
End If
' GAMMA MODEL
'============
if optgamma.Value = True Then
B1old = 0.0001
20 f = ((2 * TNF / B1old) - ((TNF * TET * B1old * TET) / ((Exp(B1old *
TET)) - 1 - (B1old * TET))) - (sum))
f1 = (-2 * TNF / B1old ^ 2) - ((TNF * (TET ^ 2)) * (((-B1old) *
((((Exp(B1old * TET)) - 1 - (B1old * TET)) ^ -2) * (((Exp(B1old * TET)) *
TET) + TET))) + (((Exp(B1old * TET)) - 1 - (B1old * TET)) ^ -1)))
b1new = B1old - (f / f1)
If Abs(b1new - B1old) < 0.00000001 Then
b0 = TNF / (1 - ((1 + b1new * TET) * (Exp(-b1new * TET))))
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = (b1new ^ 2) * b0 * (Exp(-b1new * grddata.Text)) *
grddata.Text
FD(l) = grddata.Text
grdresult1.Col = 2
grdresult1.Row = l
grdresult1.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.#######")
FI(l) = fintensity
Next l
final = (b1new ^ 2) * b0 * (Exp(-b1new * TET)) * TET
txtFI.Text = Format(final, "0.######")
Else
B1old = b1new
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GoTo 20
End If
End If
'GEOMETRIC MODEL
'===============
If optlp.Value = True Then
Dim term1 As Double, term2 As Double, t1 As Double, term3 As Double, term4
As Double
Dim sum1 As Double, k As Integer
B1old = 0.0001
30 For k = 1 To TNF
sum1 = 0
t1 = 0
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = k
sum1 = sum1 + (1 / (1 + (B1old * grddata.Text)))
t1 = t1 + ((grddata.Text) / ((1 + (B1old * grddata.Text)) ^ 2))
Next k
term1 = sum1 / B1old
term2 = -(t1 / B1old) - ((sum1) * (1 / (B1old ^ 2)))
f = term1 - ((TET * TNF) / ((1 + (TET * B1old)) * (Log(1 + (TET *
B1old)))))
term3 = (TET * TET * TNF) / ((((1 + TET * B1old)) ^ 2) * ((Log(1 + (TET *
B1old))) ^ 2))
term4 = (TET * TET * TNF) / ((((1 + TET * B1old)) ^ 2) * ((Log(1 + (TET *
B1old))) ^ 1))
f1 = term2 + term3 + term4
b1new = B1old - (f / f1)
If Abs(b1new - B1old) < 0.001 Then
b0 = (TNF / (Log(1 + (b1new * TET))))
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = (b0 * b1new) / (1 + (b1new * grddata.Text))
FD(l) = grddata.Text
grdresult1.Col = 2
grdresult1.Row = l
grdresult1.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.######")
FI(l) = fintensity
Next l
final = (b0 * b1new) / (1 + (b1new * TET))
txtFI.Text = Format(final, "0.######")
Else
B1old = b1new
GoTo 30
End If
End If
'POWER MODEL
'===========
If optpower.Value = True Then
B1old = 0.0001
40 f = (TNF / B1old) + (sumln) - (TNF * Log(TET))
f1 = (-TNF / B1old ^ 2)
b1new = B1old - (f / f1)
If Abs(b1new - B1old) < 0.00000001 Then
b0 = TNF / (TET ^ b1new)
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = b1new * b0 * (grddata.Text ^ (b1new - 1))
FD(l) = grddata.Text
grdresult1.Col = 2
grdresult1.Row = l
grdresult1.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.######")
FI(l) = fintensity
Next l
final = b1new * b0 * (TET ^ (b1new - 1))
txtFI.Text = Format(final, "0.######")
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Else
B1old = b1new
GoTo 40
End If
End If
‘WEIBULL MODEL
'=============
If optweibull.Value = True Then
Dim D As Double
D = TET * TET
B1old = 1
50 f = (-TNF) + (sumsq - (D) * ((-TNF) + (TNF / (1 - (Exp(-D * B1old))))))
* B1old
f1 = (((1 / (1 - (Exp(-B1old * D)))) - (((B1old * D * (Exp(-B1old *
D)))) / ((1 - (Exp(-B1old * D))) ^ 2))) * (-TNF * D)) + (TNF * D) + sumsq
b1new = B1old - (f / f1)
If Abs(b1new - B1old) < 0.00001 Then
b0 = TNF / (1 - (Exp(-b1new * D)))
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = 2 * b0 * b1new * grddata.Text * (Exp(-b1new *
grddata.Text * grddata.Text))
FD(l) = grddata.Text
grdresult1.Col = 2
grdresult1.Row = l
grdresult1.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.######")
FI(l) = Str(fintensity)
Next l
final = 2 * b0 * b1new * TET * (Exp(-b1new * D))
txtFI.Text = Format(final, "0.###############")
Else
B1old = b1new
GoTo 50
End If
End If
'INVERSE LINEAR MODEL
'====================
If optinverse.Value = True Then
Dim suminv As Double, inum As Double, iden As Double
Dim suminv1 As Double, j As Double
B1old = 1
60 suminv = 0
For i = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = i
suminv = suminv + (((-2) / 3) * ((1) / (B1old + grddata.Text)))
Next i
inum = ((B1old + TET) ^ ((-1) / 2)) - ((B1old) ^ ((-1) / 2))
iden = (((B1old + TET) ^ (1 / 2)) - ((B1old) ^ (1 / 2)))
f = suminv - ((1 / 2) * (TNF) * (inum / iden))
suminv1 = 0
For j = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = j
suminv1 = suminv1 + ((2 / 3) * ((1) / ((B1old + grddata.Text) ^ (2))))
Next j
f1 = suminv1 + ((-inum) * (inum / 2) * ((iden) ^ (-2))) + (((-1) / 2) *
((iden) ^ (-1)) * (((B1old + TET) ^ (-3 / 2)) - (B1old ^ (-3 / 2))))
b1new = B1old - (f / f1)
If Abs(b1new - B1old) < 1 Then
b0 = TNF / iden
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = b0 * (1 / (2 * (b1new + grddata.Text) ^ (1 / 2)))
FD(l) = grddata.Text
grdresult1.Col = 2
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grdresult1.Row = l
grdresult1.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.######")
FI(l) = fintensity
Next l
final = b0 * (1 / (2 * (b1new + TET) ^ (1 / 2)))
txtFI.Text = Format(final, "0.######")
Else
B1old = b1new
GoTo 60
End If
End If
'Graph Plotting
For p = 1 To TNF
grdresult1.Col = 2
grdresult1.Row = p
fidata(p) = grdresult1.Text
Next p
min = 1
For m = 1 To TNF
For l = 1 To TNF
If fidata(l) < min Then
min = fidata(l)
index = l
End If
Next l
sfidata(m) = min
fidata(index) = 1
min = 1
Next m
For i = 1 To TNF
values(1, i) = FD(i)
values(2, i) = FI(i)
Next i
MSChart2.Plot.UniformAxis = False
With MSChart2.Plot.Axis(VtChAxisIdX)
.AxisScale.Type = VtChScaleTypeLinear
.AxisGrid.MinorPen.Style = VtPenStyleNull
.CategoryScale.Auto = False
.ValueScale.Maximum = Val(failure(TNF))
.ValueScale.Minimum = Val(failure(1))
.AxisTitle = "Failure Data"
End With
With MSChart2.Plot.Axis(VtChAxisIdY)
.AxisScale.Type = VtChScaleTypeLinear
.AxisGrid.MinorPen.Style = VtPenStyleNull
.CategoryScale.Auto = False
.ValueScale.Maximum = Val(sfidata(TNF))
.ValueScale.Minimum = Val(sfidata(1))
.AxisTitle = "Failure Intensity"
End With
MSChart2.chartType = VtChChartType2dXY
MSChart2.ColumnCount = 2
MSChart2.RowCount = TNF
'MSChart.ShowLegend = True
'MSChart.ColumnLabel = " Failure Intensity Curve "
For introw = 1 To TNF
MSChart2.Row = introw
MSChart2.Column = 1
MSChart2.data = values(1, introw)
Next introw
For introw = 1 To TNF
MSChart2.Column = 2
MSChart2.Row = introw
MSChart2.data = values(2, introw)
Next introw
MSChart2.Visible = True
Label3.Visible = True
End Sub
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'FILE CONTROLS
'*************
Private Sub cmdopen_Click()
If txtfile.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "You must Select a Data File!"
Exit Sub
End If
pathname = dirdirectory.path
If Right(dirdirectory.path, 1) <> "\" Then
path = dirdirectory + "\"
Inp = path + txtfile.Text
Else
Inp = pathname + txtfile.Text
End If
Open Inp For Input As #1
i = 0
Do While Not EOF(1)
i = i + 1
Input #1, failure(i)
grddata.Col = 0
grddata.Row = i
grddata.Text = i
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = i
grddata.Text = Val(failure(i))
Loop
txtTNF.Text = i
Close #1
sum = 0
sumln = 0
sumsq = 0
For j = 1 To Val(txtTNF.Text)
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = j
sum = sum + grddata.Text
sumln = sumln + Log(grddata.Text)
sumsq = sumsq + ((grddata.Text) * (grddata.Text))
Next j
txtsum.Text = sum
End Sub
'RESULT TABULATION
'*****************
Private Sub cmdresults_Click()
Dim b As Integer, c As Integer
Open Inp For Input As #4
i = 0
Do While Not EOF(4)
i = i + 1
Input #4, failure(i)
grdresult1.Col = 0
grdresult1.Row = i
grdresult1.Text = i
grdresult1.Col = 1
grdresult1.Row = i
grdresult1.Text = Val(failure(i))
Loop
Close #4
For c = 1 To 5
frmresult.grdresult.ColWidth(c) = 1200
Next c
frmresult.grdresult.Row = 0
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 0
frmresult.grdresult.Text = "Failure Nos."
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 1
frmresult.grdresult.Text = "Failure Data"
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 2
frmresult.grdresult.Text = "Failure Intensity"
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 3
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frmresult.grdresult.Text = "Reliability"
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 4
frmresult.grdresult.Text = "CDF"
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 5
frmresult.grdresult.Text = "KS Distance"
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 6
frmresult.grdresult.Text = "Empirical"
Open Inp For Input As #3
i = 0
Do While Not EOF(3)
i = i + 1
Input #3, failure(i)
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 0
frmresult.grdresult.Row = i
frmresult.grdresult.Text = i
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 1
frmresult.grdresult.Row = i
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Val(failure(i))
Loop
Close #3
SSE = 0
'EXPONENTIAL MODEL
'=================
if optexponential.Value = True Then
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = b1new * b0 * (Exp(-b1new * grddata.Text))
SSE = SSE + (((l) - ((b0) * (1 - Exp(-b1new * grddata.Text)))) ^ 2)
srel = (Exp(-(srtime) * (fintensity)))
CDF1 = ((1 - Exp(-b1new * grddata.Text)))
eval1 = l / TNF
ks1 = eval1 - CDF1
FD(l) = grddata.Text
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 2
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.######")
FI(l) = fintensity
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 3
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(srel, "0.#####")
r(l) = srel
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 4
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(CDF1, "0.#####")
CDF(l) = CDF1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 5
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(ks1, "0.00000")
ks(l) = ks1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 6
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(eval1, "0.00000")
eval(l) = eval1
Next l
End If
' GAMMA MODEL
'============
If optgamma.Value = True Then
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = (b1new ^ 2) * b0 * (Exp(-b1new * grddata.Text)) * grddata.Text
srel = (Exp(-(srtime) * (fintensity)))
SSE = SSE + (((l) - ((b0) * ((1) - ((1 + b1new * grddata.Text) * (Exp(b1new * grddata.Text)))))) ^ 2)
CDF1 = ((1) - ((1 + b1new * grddata.Text) * (Exp(-b1new * grddata.Text))))
eval1 = l / TNF
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ks1 = (l / TNF) - CDF1
FD(l) = grddata.Text
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 2
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.#######")
FI(l) = fintensity
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 3
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(srel, "0.00000")
r(l) = srel
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 4
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(CDF1, "0.#####")
CDF(l) = CDF1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 5
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(ks1, "0.00000")
ks(l) = ks1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 6
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(eval1, "0.00000")
eval(l) = eval1
Next l
End If
'GEOMETRIC MODEL
'===============
If optlp.Value = True Then
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = (b0 * b1new) / (1 + (b1new * grddata.Text))
srel = (Exp(-(srtime) * (fintensity)))
SSE = SSE + (((l) - (b0 * (Log(1 + b1new * grddata.Text)))) ^ 2)
CDF1 = (Log(1 + b1new * grddata.Text) / Log(1 + b1new * failure(TNF)))
eval1 = l / TNF
ks1 = (l / TNF) - CDF1
FD(l) = grddata.Text
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 2
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.######")
FI(l) = fintensity
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 3
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(srel, "0.00000")
r(l) = srel
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 4
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(CDF1, "0.#####")
CDF(l) = CDF1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 5
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(ks1, "0.00000")
ks(l) = ks1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 6
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(eval1, "0.00000")
eval(l) = eval1
Next l
End If
'POWER MODEL
'===========
If optpower.Value = True Then
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = b1new * b0 * (grddata.Text ^ (b1new - 1))
srel = (Exp(-(srtime) * (fintensity)))
SSE = SSE + (((l) - (b0) * ((grddata.Text) ^ (b1new))) ^ 2)
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CDF1 = ((grddata.Text) ^ (b1new)) / ((failure(TNF)) ^ (b1new))
eval1 = l / TNF
ks1 = (l / TNF) - CDF1
FD(l) = grddata.Text
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 2
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.######")
FI(l) = fintensity
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 3
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(srel, "0.00000")
r(l) = srel
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 4
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(CDF1, "0.#####")
CDF(l) = CDF1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 5
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(ks1, "0.00000")
ks(l) = ks1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 6
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(eval1, "0.00000")
eval(l) = eval1
Next l
End If
WEIBULL MODEL
'=============
If optweibull.Value = True Then
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Row = l
fintensity = 2 * b0 * b1new * grddata.Text * (Exp(-b1new * grddata.Text *
grddata.Text))
srel = (Exp(-(srtime) * (fintensity)))
SSE = SSE + (((l) - ((b0) * ((1 - Exp(-b1new * ((grddata.Text) ^ 2)))))) ^
2)
CDF1 = ((1 - Exp(-b1new * ((grddata.Text) ^ 2))))
eval1 = l / TNF
ks1 = (l / TNF) - CDF1
FD(l) = grddata.Text
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 2
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.######")
FI(l) = Str(fintensity)
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 3
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(srel, "0.00000")
r(l) = srel
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 4
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(CDF1, "0.#####")
CDF(l) = CDF1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 5
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(ks1, "0.00000")
ks(l) = ks1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 6
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(eval1, "0.00000")
eval(l) = eval1
Next l
End If
'INVERSE LINEAR MODEL
'====================
If optinverse.Value = True Then
For l = 1 To TNF
grddata.Col = 1
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grddata.Row = l
fintensity = b0 * (1 / (2 * (b1new + grddata.Text) ^ (1 / 2)))
srel = (Exp(-(srtime) * (fintensity)))
SSE = SSE + (((l) - ((b0) * (((b1new + grddata.Text) ^ (1 / 2)) - ((b1new)
^ (1 / 2))))) ^ 2)
CDF1 = (((b1new + grddata.Text) ^ (1 / 2)) - ((b1new) ^ (1 / 2))) /
(((b1new + failure(TNF)) ^ (1 / 2)) - ((b1new) ^ (1 / 2)))
eval1 = l / TNF
ks1 = (l / TNF) - CDF1
FD(l) = grddata.Text
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 2
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(fintensity, "0.######")
FI(l) = fintensity
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 3
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(srel, "0.00000")
r(l) = srel
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 4
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(CDF1, "0.#####")
CDF(l) = CDF1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 5
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(ks1, "0.00000")
ks(l) = ks1
frmresult.grdresult.Col = 6
frmresult.grdresult.Row = l
frmresult.grdresult.Text = Format(eval1, "0.00000")
eval(l) = eval1
Next l
End If
frmresult.Show
End Sub
Private Sub dirdirectory_Change()
'Here we change the files according to the directory
filfiles.path = dirdirectory.path
End Sub
Private Sub drvdrive_Change()
'The next statement checks the error in the path
On Error GoTo driveerror
'change the path of the new drive
dirdirectory.path = drvdrive.Drive
Exit Sub
driveerror:
' Here we restore the original drive
MsgBox "Device is not ready !", vbCritical, "Error"
drvdrive.Drive = dirdirectory.path
End Sub
Private Sub filfiles_Click()
txtfile.Text = filfiles.FileName
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Load()
frmret.mnupsoftware.Enabled = True
grddata.ColWidth(1) = 1200
grddata.Row = 0
grddata.Col = 1
grddata.Text = "Failure Data"
MSChart2.Visible = False
Label3.Visible = False
End Sub

Result Form:
Option Explicit
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Private Sub cmdgraph_Click()
Dim a As Integer, b As Integer, c As Integer
Dim introw1 As Integer, reldata(400) As Double, sreldata(400) As Double
Dim introw2 As Integer
For p = 1 To TNF
grdresult.Col = 2
grdresult.Row = p
fidata(p) = grdresult.Text
Next p
min = 1
' sorts the failure intensity data
For m = 1 To TNF
For l = 1 To TNF
If fidata(l) < min Then
min = fidata(l)
index = l
End If
Next l
sfidata(m) = min
fidata(index) = 1
min = 1
Next m
For i = 1 To TNF
values(1, i) = FD(i)
values(2, i) = FI(i)
Next i
MSChart.Plot.UniformAxis = False
With MSChart.Plot.Axis(VtChAxisIdX)
.AxisScale.Type = VtChScaleTypeLinear
.AxisGrid.MinorPen.Style = VtPenStyleNull
.CategoryScale.Auto = False
.ValueScale.Maximum = Val(FD(TNF))
.ValueScale.Minimum = Val(FD(1))
.AxisTitle = "Failure Data"
End With
With MSChart.Plot.Axis(VtChAxisIdY)
.AxisScale.Type = VtChScaleTypeLinear
.AxisGrid.MinorPen.Style = VtPenStyleNull
.CategoryScale.Auto = False
.ValueScale.Maximum = (sfidata(TNF))
.ValueScale.Minimum = (sfidata(1))
.AxisTitle = "Failure Intensity"
End With
MSChart.chartType = VtChChartType2dXY
MSChart.ColumnCount = 2
MSChart.RowCount = TNF
For introw = 1 To TNF
MSChart.Row = introw
MSChart.Column = 1
MSChart.data = values(1, introw)
Next introw
For introw = 1 To TNF
MSChart.Column = 2
MSChart.Row = introw
MSChart.data = values(2, introw)
Next introw
' RELIABILITY GROWTH CURVE
For j = 1 To TNF
grdresult.Col = 3
grdresult.Row = j
reldata(j) = grdresult.Text
Next j
min = 100000
For a = 1 To TNF
For b = 1 To TNF
If reldata(b) < min Then
min = reldata(b)
index = b
End If
Next b
sreldata(a) = min
fidata(index) = 10000000
min = 10000000
Next a
For a = 1 To TNF
values(1, a) = FD(a)

' sorts the reliability data

125

values(3, a) = r(a)
Next a
MSChart1.Plot.UniformAxis = False
With MSChart1.Plot.Axis(VtChAxisIdX)
.AxisScale.Type = VtChScaleTypeLinear
.AxisGrid.MinorPen.Style = VtPenStyleNull
.CategoryScale.Auto = False
.ValueScale.Maximum = Val(FD(TNF))
.ValueScale.Minimum = Val(FD(1))
.AxisTitle = "Failure Data"
End With
With MSChart1.Plot.Axis(VtChAxisIdY)
.AxisScale.Type = VtChScaleTypeLinear
.AxisGrid.MinorPen.Style = VtPenStyleNull
.CategoryScale.Auto = False
.ValueScale.Maximum = 1
.ValueScale.Minimum = 0
.AxisTitle = "Reliability"
End With
MSChart1.chartType = VtChChartType2dXY
MSChart1.ColumnCount = 2
MSChart1.RowCount = TNF
For introw1 = 1 To TNF
MSChart1.Row = introw1
MSChart1.Column = 1
MSChart1.data = values(1, introw1)
Next introw1
For introw1 = 1 To TNF
MSChart1.Column = 2
MSChart1.Row = introw1
MSChart1.data = values(3, introw1)
Next introw1
'--------------------------------------------------------For c = 1 To TNF
values(6, c) = eval(c)
values(4, c) = CDF(c)
values(7, c) = c / TNF
Next c
MSChart3.Plot.UniformAxis = False
With MSChart3.Plot.Axis(VtChAxisIdX)
.AxisScale.Type = VtChScaleTypeLinear
.AxisGrid.MinorPen.Style = VtPenStyleNull
.CategoryScale.Auto = False
.ValueScale.Maximum = 1
.ValueScale.Minimum = 0
End With
With MSChart3.Plot.Axis(VtChAxisIdY)
.AxisScale.Type = VtChScaleTypeLinear
.AxisGrid.MinorPen.Style = VtPenStyleNull
.CategoryScale.Auto = False
.ValueScale.Maximum = 1
.ValueScale.Minimum = 0
End With
MSChart3.chartType = VtChChartType2dXY
MSChart3.ColumnCount = 4
MSChart3.RowCount = TNF
For introw2 = 1 To TNF
MSChart3.Row = introw2
MSChart3.Column = 1
MSChart3.data = values(4, introw2)
Next introw2
For introw2 = 1 To TNF
MSChart3.Column = 2
MSChart3.Row = introw2
MSChart3.data = values(6, introw2)
Next introw2
For introw2 = 1 To TNF
MSChart3.Row = introw2
MSChart3.Column = 3
MSChart3.data = values(7, introw2)
Next introw2
For introw2 = 1 To TNF
MSChart3.Row = introw2
MSChart3.Column = 4
MSChart3.data = values(6, introw2)
Next introw2
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Label3.Caption = "Reliability of the software for next" + Str(srtime) + " unit
time with failure intensity = " +
Str(Format(FI(TNF), "0.00000")) + " is" +
Str(Format(r(TNF), "0.0000"))
Label4.Caption = "Sum of Square of Errors is" + Str(SSE)
MSChart.Visible = True
MSChart1.Visible = True
MSChart3.Visible = True
Label1.Visible = True
Label2.Visible = True
Label3.Visible = True
Label4.Visible = True
Label5.Visible = True
End Sub
Private Sub Form_Load()
frmret.mnupresults.Enabled = True
MSChart.Visible = False
MSChart1.Visible = False
Label4.Visible = False
For i = 1 To TNF
grdresult.Col = 7
grdresult.Row = i
j = i / TNF
grdresult.Text = "j"
Next i
End Sub

System Reliability
Option Explicit
Dim k As Integer, l As Integer, m As Integer, n As Integer
Dim c As Integer, TT As Integer, CC As Integer
Dim Tset(100, 100) As Integer, Cset(100, 100) As Integer, Crel(100) As Single
Dim R1 As Single, R2 As Single, R3 As Single, R4 As Single, R5 As Single
Dim R6 As Single, R7 As Single, R8 As Single, R9 As Single, R10 As Single
Dim p As Single
Dim RU1 As Single, RU2 As Single, RU3 As Single, RU4 As Single
Dim RL1 As Single, RL2 As Single, RL3 As Single, RL4 As Single
Private Sub cmdcls1_Click()
Dim i As Integer, j As Integer
For i = 0 To 1
For j = 0 To 99
grdcrel.Col = i
grdcrel.Row = j
grdcrel.Text = ""
Next j
Next i
For i = 0 To 29
For j = 0 To 99
grdcutset.Col = i
grdcutset.Row = j
grdcutset.Text = ""
Next j
Next i
For i = 0 To 29
For j = 0 To 59
grdtieset.Col = i
grdtieset.Row = j
grdtieset.Text = ""
Next j
Next i
optd1 = False
optd2 = False
optd3 = False
optd4 = False
txtcutset.Text = ""
txtcutsetfile.Text = ""
txtnumcomp.Text = ""
txttieset.Text = ""
txttiesetfile.Text = ""
txtcrel.Text = ""
lblfinal.Caption = ""
End Sub
Private Sub cmdcrel_Click()
If txtnumcomp.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "Enter number of components for the system ", vbCritical
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Exit Sub
End If
c = Val(txtnumcomp.Text)
If txtcrel.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "You must Select a Componenet Reliability Matrix File!"
Exit Sub
End If
pathname = Dirdirectorycrel.path
If Right(Dirdirectorycrel.path, 1) <> "\" Then
path = Dirdirectorycrel + "\"
Inp = path + txtcrel.Text
Else
Inp = pathname + txtcrel.Text
End If
Open Inp For Input As #7
For i = 1 To c
grdcrel.Col = 0
grdcrel.Row = i
grdcrel.Text = "Component" + Str(i)
Next i
grdcrel.Row = 0
grdcrel.Col = 1
grdcrel.Text = "Reliability"
For i = 1 To c
Input #7, Crel(i)
grdcrel.Col = 1
grdcrel.Row = i
grdcrel.Text = Val(Crel(i))
Next i
Close #7
End Sub
Private Sub cmdsysrel_Click()
If txtcrel.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "You must Select a Componenet Reliability Matrix File!"
Exit Sub
End If
If txtcutsetfile.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "You must Select a Cutset Matrix File!"
Exit Sub
End If
If txttiesetfile.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "You must Select a Tieset Matrix File!"
Exit Sub
End If
If txtnumcomp.Text = "" Or txtcutset.Text = "" Or txttieset.Text = "" Then
MsgBox "Enter number of components for the system and/or number of cutset/tieset
for the system", vbCritical
Exit Sub
End If
If optd1 = False And optd2 = False And optd3 = False And optd4 = False Then
MsgBox "Select presicion for reliability"
Exit Sub
End If
R1 = 0
For i = 1 To TT
p = 1
For j = 1 To c
If Tset(i, j) = 1 Then
p = p * Crel(j)
End If
Next j
R1 = R1 + p
Next i
R2 = 0
For i = 1 To TT - 1
For k = i + 1 To TT
p = 1
For j = 1 To c
If Tset(i, j) = 1 Or Tset(k, j) = 1 Then
p = p * Crel(j)
End If
Next j
R2 = R2 + p
Next k
Next i
R3 = 0
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For i = 1 To TT - 2
For k = i + 1 To TT - 1
For l = k + 1 To TT
p = 1
For j = 1 To c
If Tset(i, j) = 1 Or Tset(k,
p = p * Crel(j)
End If
Next j
R3 = R3 + p
Next l
Next k
Next i
R4 = 0
For i = 1 To TT - 3
For k = i + 1 To TT - 2
For l = k + 1 To TT - 1
For m = l + 1 To TT
p = 1
For j = 1 To c
If Tset(i, j) = 1 Or Tset(k,
p = p * Crel(j)
End If
Next j
R4 = R4 + p
Next m
Next l
Next k
Next i
R5 = 0
For i = 1 To CC
p = 1
For j = 1 To c
If Cset(i, j) = 1 Then
p = p * (1 - Crel(j))
End If
Next j
R5 = R5 + p
Next i
R6 = 0
For i = 1 To CC - 1
For k = i + 1 To CC
p = 1
For j = 1 To c
If Cset(i, j) = 1 Or Cset(k,
p = p * (1 - Crel(j))
End If
Next j
R6 = R6 + p
Next k
Next i
R7 = 0
For i = 1 To CC - 2
For k = i + 1 To CC - 1
For l = k + 1 To CC
p = 1
For j = 1 To c
If Cset(i, j) = 1 Or Cset(k,
p = p * (1 - Crel(j))
End If
Next j
R7 = R7 + p
Next l
Next k
Next i
R8 = 0
For i = 1 To CC - 3
For k = i + 1 To CC - 2
For l = k + 1 To CC - 1
For m = l + 1 To CC
p = 1
For j = 1 To c
If Cset(i, j) = 1 Or Cset(k,
p = p * (1 - Crel(j))
End If
Next j

j) = 1 Or Tset(l, j) = 1 Then

j) = 1 Or Tset(l, j) = 1 Or Tset(m, j) = 1 Then

j) = 1 Then

j) = 1 Or Cset(l, j) = 1 Then

j) = 1 Or Cset(l, j) = 1 Or Cset(m, j) = 1 Then
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R8 = R8 + p
Next m
Next l
Next k
Next i
R10 = 0
For i = 1 To CC - 4
For k = i + 1 To CC - 3
For l = k + 1 To CC - 2
For m = l + 1 To CC - 1
For n = m + 1 To CC
p = 1
For j = 1 To c
If Cset(i, j) = 1 Or Cset(k, j) = 1 Or Cset(l, j) = 1 Or Cset(m, j)
j) = 1 Then
p = p * (1 - Crel(j))
End If
Next j
R10 = R10 + p
Next n
Next m
Next l
Next k
Next i
If optd1 = True Then
lblfinal.Caption = "The system reliability is :" + Format((1 - R5 +
R10), "0.00")
End If
If optd2 = True Then
lblfinal.Caption = "The system reliability is :" + Format((1 - R5 +
R10), "0.000")
End If
If optd3 = True Then
lblfinal.Caption = "The system reliability is :" + Format((1 - R5 +
R10), "0.0000")
End If
If optd4 = True Then
lblfinal.Caption = "The system reliability is :" + Format((1 - R5 +
R10), "0.00000")
End If
End Sub

= 1 Or Cset(n,

R6 - R7 + R8 -

R6 - R7 + R8 -

R6 - R7 + R8 -

R6 - R7 + R8 -
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